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I. INTRODUCTION
For intellectual property lawyers, the first decade of the twenty-first
century is a period of history-in-the-making. This perception is reinforced
on a daily basis by rapidly changing digital and biomedical technologies,
an increasingly globalized economy, and growing public debate about the
appropriate subject matter, scope, and duration of intellectual property
rights. In copyright law, the issues generating the most heated debate
continue to be those pertaining to the law’s division of rights between
producers, distributors, and consumers of music.1 Indeed, music copyright
owners, together with members of the motion picture industry, are the
vanguard pushing for unprecedented expansion in the scope of copyright,
and these owners are on the offensive on the Internet,2 in the courts,3 and
in Congress.4 Notably, the dispute at the heart of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.5 was instigated by the tens of millions of
Internet users exchanging primarily music files over peer-to-peer
networks.6
These copyright-owner initiatives have drawn passionate opposition
from a broad coalition of technology companies, consumer activists, and
artists’ groups. The coalition argues that, to promote the progress of

1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG , FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 296 (2004) (“The battle that got this

whole [culture] war going was about music, so it wouldn’t be fair to end this book without
addressing the issue that is, to most people, most pressing—music.”).
2. See James Maguire, Hitting P2P Users Where It Hurts, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 13, 2003
(describing operations of Overpeer, a company hired by record labels and other copyright owners
to use technological means to disrupt peer-to-peer networks), at http://www.wired.com/news/dig
iwood/0,1412,57112,00.html.
3. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has been engaged in an ongoing
legal campaign against individual users of peer-to-peer networks. See, e.g., Recording Industry
Ass’n of America, New Round of Lawsuits Against 717 Illegal File Sharers Includes Continued
Focus on University Network Users Who Illegally Download Music, Jan. 24, 2005, at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/012405.asp. The recording companies also have pursued
litigation against a series of online intermediaries, most notably Napster, Inc. See A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. The music and film industries pursued a number of initiatives during the 108th Congress.
See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Legislation, 108th Congress, at http://www.copyright.gov/
legislation/archive/ (listing recent bills).
5. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (upholding the doctrine of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984), and reframing secondary liability in terms of intentional inducement).
6. A peer-to-peer network is formed when two or more computing devices have roughly
equivalent rights to request and receive information from other “peer” devices on the network. See
DAVID BARKAI, PEER-TO-PEER COMPUTING: TECHNOLOGIES FOR SHARING AND COLLABORATING ON
THE NET 5-6 (2001). Peer-to-peer networks frequently use the Internet's basic architecture and are
defined at the application layer of the network. See id. at 4.
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science, copyright law should be forward-looking and should not be
designed to preserve the legacy business models of publishers and other
distributors.7 Moreover, the argument goes, even if incumbent distributors
deserve special consideration, they cannot be trusted to know what legal
regime would best serve their long-term interests. Exhibit A for both of
these arguments is the 1980s dispute over the VCR, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.8 As is well known, film and television publishers considered
the VCR to pose a dire threat to their revenues.9 Jack Valenti, thenChairman of the Motion Picture Association of America, famously
pronounced, “[t]he VCR is to the motion picture industry and the
American public . . . what the Boston strangler is to the woman alone.”10
As is equally well known, the studios’ predictions about the economic
effects of the VCR were drastically wrong. 11
This Article focuses on a similar episode in the evolution of copyright
law in which incumbent distributors resisted a legal change that ultimately
inured to their benefit. For, ironically, although music copyright owners are
among the most aggressive groups seeking to expand the concept of
copyright today, their forbears in England resisted the very idea that
copyright should apply to music. As this Article relates, music became
copyrightable in England primarily through litigation brought by
professional composers against music publishers during the eighteenth
century. The capstone case was brought by the most famous composer in
London at the time, Johann Christian Bach, youngest son of Johann
Sebastian Bach and one of the important musical influences for young
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Nearly seventy years after copyright had been
invented in England, the Court of King’s Bench ruled that musical
compositions also were subject to copyright protection.12
7. See generally Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278
(2004) (arguing that copyright law should be aligned with the communication law’s competition
policy).
8. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 71 (2004).
10. See id. at 73.
11. See id. at 75-76, 81 (demonstrating that, by 1990, home video revenues were $5.1 billion
without any diminution in other revenue streams).
12. See Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1275 (K.B. 1777). The judicial extension of
copyright to music copyright in England greatly influenced the subsequent legislative extension of
copyright to music in the United States. The 1831 general revision to the Copyright Act generally
was designed to bring United States law into greater harmony with English law, primarily by
lengthening the term of protection. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436; see
also 7 REG. DEB., at cxix (Dec. 17, 1830), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llrd&f
ileName=010/llrd010.db&recNum=548 (stating that goal of bill was “to place authors in this
country more nearly upon an equality with authors in other countries”) (statement by Rep.

910

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

Within legal scholarship, the struggle for composer’s copyright has
been underreported and understudied. Attention to the genesis of music
copyright reminds us that copyright was invented to solve a particular
problem for book publishers in eighteenth-century England and that the
subsequent expansion of copyright’s domain has been neither natural nor
inevitable. The concept of author’s rights embodied in copyright law need
not extend to all forms of expression. Rather, periodic expansion of the
subject matter, scope, or duration of rights under copyright represents
outcomes of specific legal and political contests in which the interests of
those seeking to broaden copyright generally have prevailed. Current
contests, as well as past outcomes, should be evaluated in light of current
circumstances, with due attention given to those who gain and lose from
the law’s expansion.
There are two other reasons why developing a better understanding of
music copyright’s evolution matters. A central question for how the law
should respond to music copyright owners’ initiatives is whether to focus
on the future of copyright law generally or on the future of music copyright
more specifically. History is relevant to how this question should be
answered. Those engaged in contemporary debates about music copyright
often assume that because digital technologies affect the distribution and
creation of many kinds of copyrighted works, music is merely the canary
in the coal mine for copyright law.13 On this view, any changes in the law
brought about by music disputes should apply uniformly to all forms of
expression. Rights in music implicate a wide variety of interests, and
copyright law has been tailored time and again to allocate rights in
response to particular conditions prevailing in the music business.14 For
that reason, under current U.S. law, the most complex and ornate portions
of the Copyright Act are those that apply to music.15 An understanding of
Ellsworth). Ellsworth was the son-in-law of Noah Webster who had been the principal advocate for
revision and extension of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Letter from N. Webster to William Chancery
Fowler (Jan. 29, 1831), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 424-25 (Harry R. Warfel, ed. 1953) (taking
credit for stirring Congress to action on copyright). The addition of “musical composition[s]” to
the list of copyrightable subject matter was incidental to that effort. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 21st Cong.,
2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436.
13. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 76-95 (2000) (treating music as “[i]ntellectual [p]roperty’s
[c]anary in the [d]igital [c]oal [m]ine”).
14. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2005) (declaring public rebroadcast of musical works in
certain retail establishments to be noninfringing); id. § 115 (granting statutory license to record
“cover” versions of copyrighted songs); id. § 114 (granting elaborate and ornate statutory license
for noninteractive digital performances of sound recordings).
15. See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 673 (2003) (describing the complexity of contemporary music copyright); Michael
W. Carroll, A Primer on U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Applicable to Music Information
Retrieval Systems, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 313 (2003) (describing the basic structure of
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this history supports arguments that current disputes concerning music
copyright may be better resolved with tailored solutions rather than through
broad changes in copyright law as a whole.16
History also supplies authority for arguments about how copyright has
evolved and should evolve.17 The importance of an accurate understanding
of copyright history was brought into stark relief in the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,18 in which the Court relied almost
entirely on its telling of copyright history to interpret the constitutional
provision empowering Congress to create federal copyright law.19 Rather
than address the petitioners’ structural arguments, the Court invoked a
Holmesian quip—“a page of history is worth a volume of logic”20—to hold
that Congress’ “unbroken” practice of retrospectively extending the term
of copyright rendered that practice constitutional.21
Importantly, the Eldred Court signaled that copyright history would
continue to supply relevant authority in future cases, particularly with
respect to any limits the First Amendment might place on rights under
copyright.22 Since disputes about music copyright rank among the most
music copyright); see also R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions:
Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 252 (2001)
(discussing the complexity of law governing digital audio transmissions).
16. Some leading intellectual property scholars are advancing proposals recognizing that
music copyright may require a different or more nuanced settlement with respect to uses of new
technologies. See generally FISHER, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing that peer-to-peer distribution of
music and film should be legalized through an alternative compensation scheme); see also LESSIG ,
supra note 1, at 296-303 (arguing that we should “[l]iberate the [m]usic—[a]gain” by reducing the
scope and duration of copyright law and by adopting a supplementary, temporary alternative
compensation scheme); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1
(2004) (advocating reconsideration of applying current copyright law to digital distribution).
17. As Roscoe Pound noted, the main sources used to explain and justify legal adaptations
are authoritative, philosophical, and historical. See ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 2 (1923).
18. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
19. Id. at 200-02, 204.
20. Id. 200 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
21. Id. at 204; see also id. at 213-14 (“Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding
generation thus overwhelms petitioners’ argument that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights
fails per se to ‘promote the Progress of Science.’”).
22. Rejecting the need for an independent First Amendment defense to copyright
infringement at this time, the Court concluded:
To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in
free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them. We recognize that
the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.” . . . But when, as in this
case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.
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pressing issues of the day in contemporary intellectual property law, it is
time that the nuances of music copyright’s evolution be better understood.
If the question presented in future cases entails copyright’s governance of
music, copyright law’s traditional contours should be ascertained with
acknowledgment and understanding of the distinct evolution of music
copyright.
This Article begins to close the gap in the legal literature concerning the
origins and evolution of music copyright by investigating three deceptively
simple questions: (1) when did copyright law first apply to music; (2) how
did this change in the law occur; and (3) why did it occur.23 The inquiry
proceeds as follows. Section II supplies a brief, theoretical framework for
this history and explains the methodology used in gathering the historical
data. Economic theory plays an important role in contemporary copyright
discussions, and economic theories of how property rights evolve often are
explicitly or implicitly relied upon in these conversations. These theories
are functionalist and materialist in orientation, and this Article focuses on
the relation between changing material circumstances and music
copyright’s evolution. While economic theories may partially explain
relevant developments, I argue that the methodologies and focus of
intellectual history also are deeply relevant to understanding how music
became copyrightable subject matter. Section III revisits the invention of
copyright in England in 171024 and the struggle for music copyright
between professional composers and music publishers during the course
of the eighteenth century. A series of unheralded equity cases led to Bach
v. Longman,25 in which the Court of King’s Bench held that printed music
was within the first copyright law, the Statute of Anne.26 Finally, Section
IV briefly analyzes certain aspects of the struggle for composer’s copyright
and relates these to contemporary debates about music copyright.

Id. at 221 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Defining copyright law’s “traditional contours,” id.,
necessarily will require a recitation and reliance upon copyright history.
23. This investigation follows on the heels of my earlier exploration of the initial
commodification of music. See generally Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How
We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004)
(recontextualizing the controversy over the exchange of music files on the Internet).
24. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Author’s [sic] or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, 8 Ann., ch.
19 (1710). Under the consensus view, not challenged here, an essential element that makes a law
a “copyright” law is that the creator of intangible expression, rather than a publisher or patron,
receives the initial legal entitlement to control reproduction and distribution of the work.
25. 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1777).
26. Id. at 1275.
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II. METHO DOLOG ICAL FRAMEWORK
As the current struggle over the proper scope of music copyright
unfolds, it is important to understand the historical baseline for this branch
of the law.27 Intellectual property scholars apparently are taking this point
to heart, as academic interest in the history of intellectual property law is
again on the rise.28 Economic and cultural historians also have been drawn
to the subject.29 Reflecting this upsurge in interest, the University of

27. As Max Radin admonished, lawyers should “consider[] carefully their legal ideas in the
historical setting in which they were developed,” for if they “do not take this task seriously, they
will not cease to be historians. They merely will be bad historians.” MAX RADIN, THE LAW AND YOU
189 (1948); accord Frederick Bernays Wiener, Selden Society Lecture, Uses and Abuses of Legal
History: A Practitioner’s View 32 (1962).
28. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT : PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2001) (discussing the application of old copyright laws to new technology); Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (discussing the challenges digital technology poses to present concepts
of intellectual property); Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response
to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (2004) (arguing that extension
of copyright to photography should be understood in relation to social practices rather than as
natural expansion of the idea of copyright); Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the
Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN . 1 (2003) (discussing history and application of
the copyright work-for-hire doctrine); Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets,
Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920,
52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001) (surveying development of corporate intellectual property law); Paul
Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What’s Culture Got to Do With It?, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (2000) (evaluating functions of past, present, and future copyright
law); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and
America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990) (comparing and contrasting development of copyright law in
France and the United States); Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763
(2003) (discussing technology’s role in shaping copyright law); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000)
[hereinafter Merges, Hundred Years] (discussing adaption of intellectual property law to technology
in the twentieth century); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001) (providing intellectual history of early
development of patents); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (suggesting that copyright law in digital age should develop to enhance a
democratic society); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 215 (2002) (providing a historical development of public domain in intellectual property
law); Maureen A. O’Rourke, A Brief History of Author-Publisher Relations and the Outlook for
the 21st Century, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 425 (2004) (evaluating appropriateness of returns
that authors receive for copyrighted materials); Rosemary J. Coombe, Challenging Paternity:
Histories of Copyright, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN . 397 (1994) (book review) (praising subject book’s
historical analysis of the development of copyright law); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds
to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Nov. 13,
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss,
Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
29. See, e.g., B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
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Wisconsin School of Law recently hosted an important and precedent-setting
conference on intellectual property history.30
When explaining changes in the law, two sets of distinctions tend to
emerge at a very high level of generality. One is between external and
internal perspectives, which we might label functional and autonomist views.
From a functional perspective, the law is instrumental and changes in
response to changing needs or interests external to the law.31 From an
autonomist view, law and society develop along different paths, with the law
striving for internal coherence. A second distinction is between material
interests and conceptual categories, with the former being the subject of
economic and other materialist histories and the latter being the subject of
intellectual history. Materialist history focuses on the organization of the
means and modes of production in society and holds that these primarily
determine historical change. Intellectual history tends to give primacy to
conceptual structures and the discourses that animate these.32 Taken together,
these distinctions form the following perspectival matrix.33

Functionalism

Materialism

Intellectualism

Functionalist-Materialism

FunctionalistIntellectualism

Law is driven by changes
in means and modes of
production and
concomitant social
changes.

Law is driven by
intellectual movements
and conceptual changes
outside the law.

COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 (2005); JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN,
THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002); JOEL MOKYR, THE
GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2002); MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).
30. See Owning Knowledge: The History of Modern U.S. Intellectual Property Law
(Symposium Program, Nov. 13, 2004), at http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/EventsattheInstitute.htm (last
visited July 10, 2005). This conference was quickly followed by the Berkeley-Wisconsin History
of Copyright Workshop. See Berkeley-Wisconsin History of Copyright Workshop (Workshop
Agenda, May 20-21, 2005) at http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/BerkeleyIPWorkshop.htm.
31. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60-61 (1984).
32. See, e.g., id. at 88 n.77 (“In some of the very best recent work in legal history, even
writers thoroughly committed to placing legal forms in social and economic context have stressed
how important it is to understand the internal structures and logics of such forms on their own
terms.”); id. at 98-99 (describing the critique of evolutionary functionalism by historicizing
consciousness).
33. Thanks to Oren Bracha for suggesting this organization.
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AutonomistIntellectualism
Law strives for internal
coherence and changes
in response to
intellectual movements
within the law.

This matrix reflects analytical distinctions that can be drawn from various
histories, but almost no historian subscribes rigidly to only one perspective.
Instead, these categories are useful to illustrate points of emphasis.
The history of intellectual property law largely has been told from
functionalist perspectives. For functional-materialist historians, particularly
economic historians, the development of copyright is part of a broader
story about the evolution of property rights.
Economic historians generally tell one of two tales about the evolution
of property rights. The first is a tale of progress and is a form of Whig
history34 that finds support in the economic theory of property rights
propounded by Harold Demsetz.35 His is an efficiency story in which legal
actors create and administer new property rights whenever resources
become sufficiently valuable so that the incentive benefits that private
property rights supply outweigh the transaction costs that a private property
system imposes.36 While developed to explain the increasing complexity
of property rights in tangible property over time, the Demsetz theory
readily can be translated for intangible property.37 On this view, the
episodic expansion in the scope, duration, and subject matter of intellectual

34. See generally H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (G. Bell and
Sons, Ltd. 1963) (1931) (arguing that Whigs developed a progressivist historical narrative that
placed them at an evolutionary apex); C.T. MCINTIRE, HERBERT BUTTERFIELD: HISTORIAN AS
DISSENTER (2004) (explaining how Butterfield came to his argument).
35. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967). The Demsetz tale of property echoes an earlier evolutionary theory propounded by Adam
Smith. See P ETER STEIN , LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 32-46 (1980) (describing
unpublished series of lectures Smith gave on legal evolution, with particular attention to evolution
of property rights and institutions needed to secure such rights); id. at 36 (describing the emergence
of private property in land along with the emergence of courts and legislatures).
36. See Demsetz, supra note 35, at 350. For a more critical view of economists’ efficiency
assumptions regarding private property, see generally Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and
the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1982), reprinted in 39 TULSA L. REV. 663 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 192-94 (2003) [hereinafter Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path] (explaining how the
Demsetz story can be adapted for intellectual property).
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property rights throughout history reflects the increased social value of
information as an economic resource.38
From this progressivist perspective, copyright would apply to music at
the point in time when music’s value as a resource had risen sufficiently
to make the administrative costs of copyright socially worthwhile. The
reader may well ask how music functions as a resource. Most people
experience music either by listening to or playing it, and music’s value
increases when people, on average, value more highly these experiences.39
To measure such an increase in value, economists look for data showing
a willingness and ability to pay higher prices or a larger share of one’s
financial resources for musical experiences. An economist looks not only
at prices of direct musical experience, such as the price of concert tickets,
but also at the prices of all inputs into musical experience, including
musical instruments, musical education, and, most importantly for our
purposes, new musical compositions to play or to hear.40 As the value of
music rises, a Demsetzian would expect property rights in all inputs to be
created or to become better defined. Consequently, an increase in the value
of musical experiences should be expected to lead to the extension of
property rights in new musical compositions.
Other economically-oriented scholars tell a more skeptical counternarrative. To them, the Whiggish character of the Demsetzian theory
undermines it.41 From the perspective of the new institutional economics,
the Demsetz view is the “naive theory of property rights”42 because it
ignores the political process that forges such rights.43 Once politics enters
the picture, the progress of property law in general, and intellectual
property law in particular, is better explained by the marginally successful

38. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 3, 28-32 (2004) (advancing the neo-Demsetzian
model); see also id. at 48 (“I argue that there actually is a degree of determinacy in the evolution
of the laws of intellectual property.”).
39. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES 33 (2004).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 412 (2003) (“If we think about the history of intellectual property
law since the Middle Ages, we can, just as with Demsetz’s theory of the emergence of property
rights in physical property, easily tell a ‘Whiggish’ (history as progressive) story in which the
growth of intellectual property rights is explained by reference to material and social changes that
increased the social value of such rights.”). On the Demsetzian view, it would be an increase in the
social value of the underlying information that would drive the growth of intellectual property
rights. See, e.g., Gary DeLibecap, Toward an Understanding of Property Rights, in EMPIRICAL
STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 31, 32 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996) (“[I]t is not actual rent,
but rather potential rent, that drives the demand for property rights.”).
42. See THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 271 (1990).
43. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1867-68 (2000).
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rent-seeking efforts of incumbent rightsholders.44 On this view, the
increase in the economic value of information during the twentieth century
has led to increased investments in rent-seeking by intellectual property
owners,45 and many prognosticators expect this trend to continue
unabated.46 From this perspective, we should expect to see copyright
invented when the creation of such rights would materially benefit a wellorganized and focused interest group, such as authors or publishers, and we
should expect copyright to be extended to music under similar conditions.
As is discussed below, the historical record provides some support for this
view, but its account is incomplete.
It is easy to set the optimism of the Demsetzian theory47 and the
pessimism of the public choice story in opposition,48 but it is important to
see how both theories share a commitment to a functional-materialist
methodology to explain legal change. On either view, historical research
should focus on data that illuminates increases in the social value of
information and the battle for distribution of the economic surpluses made
possible by this increase in value. From both perspectives, law generally
lacks autonomy and the evolution of the contours and contents of any
exclusive rights in such information will be shaped entirely by materiallymotivated investments in legal reform in response to changes in the value
of information.
Although economic analysis plays an important role in most
contemporary discourse about intellectual property, including its history,
its functional-materalist methodology is not the only relevant perspective.
The intellectualist perspectives also matter.49 Intellectual historians
generally are more modest and nuanced in their explanatory objectives. As
Terry Fisher explains, only some contemporary methodologies of
intellectual history seek to produce a causal account, while others reject

44. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 110 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1990) (“Because polities make and enforce
economic rules, it is not surprising that property rights are seldom efficient.”); Saul Levmore, Two
Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 429 (2002) [hereinafter
Levmore, Two Stories].
45. See, e.g., Merges, Hundred Years, supra note 28, at 2234-39 (describing increased
lobbying efforts and expenditures by intellectual property owners).
46. See, e.g., Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 37, at 193-94 (predicting that
intellectual property owners will seek to extend existing rights to abstract ideas); Merges, Hundred
Years, supra note 28, at 2233-35.
47. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 332 (2002); Levmore, Two Stories, supra note 44, at 429.
48. See Levmore, Two Stories, supra note 44, at 429 (describing the pessimism of the public
choice theory).
49. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (describing four
distinct methodologies arising out of an intellectual history approach to legal evolution).
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causal explanations altogether.50 Consequently, intellectual historians
generally reject efforts to fashion general rules of causation. Nonetheless,
one can infer from at least some intellectual histories of law a view that
law’s domain is partially autonomous and that the evolution of legal
concepts, such as property rights, may be better explained by innovative
theories advanced by leading jurists, legislators, and advocates attempting
to advance internal coherence or other values rather than simply
responding to changing material conditions.51
On this view, the careers of legal concepts such as property and
authorship follow paths carved by legal and political imagination in
framing discourse.52 Under this view, the relevant agents of change will not

50. See id. at 1088-95.
51. See, e.g., id. at 1076-79 (describing the contextualist legal history).
52. Reflecting this more intellectualist view of legal evolution, contemporary legal scholars
vigorously debate whether information protected by copyright or patent is really “property.” See,
e.g., James Boyle, The Public Domain: The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (analogizing the modern expansion of
intellectual property rights to the first enclosure movement in England); Stephen L. Carter, Does
It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993)
(commenting on the implications of the debate about whether intellectual property is “property”);
Julie E. Cohen, Panel 2; Workplace Monitoring: Cyber-Snooping, and Cookies: Creating
Standards for Watching or Not Watching: Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375, 379 (2002) (comparing cyberspace display rights with real
space display rights); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation of Computing and Information Technology:
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996) (explaining how historic property
issues emerge in the computer network environment); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]
(arguing that treating intellectual property as property is fundamentally misguided); Stewart E.
Sterk, What’s in a Name?: The Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellectual Property
(Working Paper No. 88, Aug. 2004) (analyzing the disparities in justifying real property rights and
intellectual property rights), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=575121. Similarly, scholars
debate whether the concepts of “monopoly” or “intellectual property” appropriately capture the
relevant features of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, the right of publicity, and a hodge
podge of other state law doctrines. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and
Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of
Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 147 (1996); Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 414-15 (2003); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors
in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-38 (2000); Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction
in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 399 (1989); Lemley, Free Riding, supra,
at 4-6.
A related debate about the construction of authorship in copyright law reflects the same
concern. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 51-60 (1996); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:
TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1-56 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE , THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 23 (1998) (seeking “simultaneously to undertake and to undermine
modern anthropologic authorship”); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners:
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necessarily be those with the most to gain materially from new property
rights, but jurists, legislators, and scholars who advance innovative
conceptions of exclusive rights. Thus, while this approach does not predict
the set of conditions under which music copyright should be expected to
evolve, it does suggest that historical investigation should focus on the way
in which the general concept of copyright was fashioned in legal, political,
and social discourse and how that development interrelated with the
conceptual status of social practices involved in musicmaking. 53
This Article gathers data relevant to both functional-materialist and
intellectualist methodologies and preliminarily assesses the value of each
approach to understanding the origins of music copyright. Since economic
historians make the more aggressive explanatory claims, I focus attention
on data relevant to their claims, while periodically alluding to information
supporting and relevant to an intellectual history of music copyright. While
professional composers and music publishers appear to have been
motivated by economic self-interest in many respects, functionalmaterialist theory standing alone has difficulty explaining why composers
and publishers were not even more aggressive in pursuing their selfinterest by, for example, demanding that rights under copyright extend to
commercial public performance. Similarly, functional-materialist theory
suggests reasons why music publishers should have embraced the
extension of copyright to music rather than resist it as they did. To gain a
better understanding for why the struggle for music copyright unfolded as
it did, some reference to conceptions of author’s rights and the books to
which those rights attached is necessary as well.
For that reason, this Article also identifies data and trends relevant to
a more intellectualist understanding of composer’s copyright. An
intellectual historian would give greater causal weight to broader trends in
Romantic individualism and would expect music to be brought within the
law’s ambit as the concepts of authorship and protectable works of
authorship expanded to embrace more than literary authors and printed
books. From what available sources reveal, neither a functional-materialist
nor an intellectualist account, standing alone, fully explains the
development of copyright in music.
Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1993)
(discussing the ways in which the concept of authorship leads to withdrawal of material from the
public domain); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991) (arguing that authorship is a fundamental concept of copyright law);
Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 728 (1993) (“[C]urrent copyright dogma does not recognize that so-called
‘works of authorship’ are . . . unstable and dependent on context.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 879-95 (1997) (book review).
53. See generally, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29 (discussing the historical notion of literary
property); LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 29 (discussing theories of authorship and institutional origins
of intellectual property).
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III. THE STRUGGLE FOR COMPOSER’S COPYRIGHT IN ENGLAND
England is the birthplace of modern copyright law, and it is therefore
not surprising that the struggle for copyright in music also took place there.
What is less obvious is why there was a struggle over music at all. To
better comprehend this episode in copyright’s evolution, it is important to
recall how and why copyright law was invented and to understand the
relatively different positions that musical composers and music publishers
held in society as compared to the positions of literary authors and
booksellers.
A. Background to the Struggle
The backdrop for both the invention of copyright and the struggle for
composer’s copyright is what Jürgen Habermas has dubbed the emergent
“public sphere” in eighteenth-century England.54 London was the largest
and one of the wealthiest cities in Europe during the eighteenth century,55
and this concentration of people and resources supplied the impetus for the
growth of the public press and the growth of public meeting places, such
as the more than 3,000 coffee houses in London and the public pleasure
gardens.56 In this sphere, where politics and culture equally were the
subject of conversation and debate, the printed page also became a public
space for dialogue and discourse. Consequently, the publishing business
generally began to flourish.57 Music publishing experienced similar growth,
as the growth of the public sphere created new places for the public
performance of secular music, which led to demand for printed music to
enable performance of the day’s popular songs in the home. Composers’
desires to exert greater control over the publication of their music sparked

54. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 22-23, 38 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (1962).
The author dates the formation of this public in England from the first decades of the eighteenth
century, but recent critical scholarship roots the theory much earlier in the seventeenth century. See
David Zaret, Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century
England, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 212, 216-17 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
55. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 39, at 43; SIMON MCVEIGH, CONCERT LIFE IN LONDON
FROM MOZART TO HAYDN 53 (1993) (noting that London’s population increased from 575,000 in
1700 to 900,000 in 1801).
56. See MICHAEL CHANAN, MUSICA PRACTICA: THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF WESTERN MUSIC
FROM GREGORIAN CHANT TO POSTMODERNISM 130 (1994) (“[T]he pleasure gardens . . . with their
tree-lined walks, refreshment booths and bandstands, provided relaxing open urban spaces where
social distinctions tended to be disregarded at least enough for the ranks to mingle.”); Zaret, supra
note 54, at 12.
57. See RUSSEL SANJEK, 1 AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS: THE FIRST FOUR
HUNDRED YEARS 250-51 (1988) (describing the growth of the English publishing business because
of increasing literacy and increasing interest in scientific inquiry and education).
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litigation over music’s relation to the relatively new copyright law, the
Statute of Anne.58
1. The Law
Within legal scholarship, the general story of how the first copyright
statute was enacted and interpreted is familiar,59 and only a few features
most relevant to music copyright are rehearsed here.
a. Pre-Copyright
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the predecessor to
copyright emerged in the form of the royal printing privilege and the royal
license or, in England, the letter patent.60 Each printing privilege was an ad
hoc form of policymaking that could range widely in subject matter, scope,
and duration.61 Granting exclusive rights in information was a form of
public spending.62 In some cases, granting a privilege was a political
favor.63 In others, the promise of protection from competition was granted
to induce investment in the publishing of works for which demand was

58. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710).
59. See generally, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1968) (tracing the history of copyright law to illuminate current legal debate on the subject); ROSE,
supra note 29 (illustrating the development of copyright law from the Middle Ages to the present).
60. Legal and other scholars generally have described and analyzed the use of the privilege
in relation to the book trade. See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright
Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 381-402
(2004). The letter “patent” was a form of privilege granted in England. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I), 76 J. PAT
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 700 (1994); see also HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT
STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, at 25-27 (1956) (“As
time went on, the distinction between the printing privilege granted by warrant and the rights
conveyed by letters patent became indistinct.”).
61. See generally Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The History of Anglo-American Intellectual
Property Law (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with author). Printing
privileges tended to fall into one of three distinct classes: (1) privileges to print a book of unknown
or collective authorship; (2) privileges to print groups of books on a particular subject or in a
particular category, including books not yet written; and (3) privileges to print named books by
named authors. See John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Authors’
Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 191, 192-93
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
62. See Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 229, 229 (2003) (arguing that “[c]opyright exhibits
means and ends remarkably similar to those of social welfare programs.”); Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 329 (2004).
63. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29, at 17 (giving examples of printing privileges as rewards
for loyal service).
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uncertain.64 Authors had no legal right to complain about the unauthorized
reproduction of their work, and they would be paid, if at all, by a lump sum
in exchange for their manuscripts.65 Although privileges may have
appeared to be a cheap means of conferring favors or encouraging
innovation, political authorities soon found that they had been too easily
persuaded to grant publishing privileges and that doing so came with a
social cost.66
Copyright law was invented in England largely because the English
Crown chose to consolidate its licensing and privilege grants by granting
a general charter to the London guilds involved in book publishing, the
Company of Stationers.67 To manage printing rights inter se, the Stationers
invented an administrative and judicial mechanism for recognizing and
enforcing a publisher’s rights in a copy acquired from the author.68 During
the course of the seventeenth century, however, Parliament responded to
growing hostility to royal power generally, and royal power to censor
expression and regulate trade particularly, by permitting the Printing Act
of 1662 to lapse in 1694, leaving the book publishing trade largely
unregulated.69 The lapse meant the end of the property rights in copies that
the Stationers had become accustomed to and the end of censorship by the
Surveyor of the Press. As Benjamin Kaplan quipped: “Three cheers for
freedom of the press; but what, now, was to become of the stationers?”70
b. The Statute of Anne
The Stationers quickly mobilized to seek legislative protection from
unauthorized publication.71 Indeed, a small group of the most powerful
booksellers, who had formed a cartel known as a “[c]onger,” were the

64. See ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, BEFORE COPYRIGHT: THE FRENCH BOOK PRIVILEGE SYSTEM
1498-1526, at 66, 80-83 (1990) (describing the predominant theme in petitions for privileges as the
need to secure a fair return on a risky investment in publication).
65. See, e.g., RANSOM, supra note 60, at 34 (stating that authors had no right to publishing
royalties and that any earnings beyond sale of the manuscript would depend upon “his bookseller’s
generosity”).
66. Early privileges granted to publishers in Venice limited the abilities of new publishers
to ply their trade. In 1517, the Venetian Senate revoked all existing privileges not issued on its own
authority. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 64, at 6-7; BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN
PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 45 (1967) (“[A]buses arose as publishers flocked to the government
to reserve well-known titles for themselves.”). In other cases, the limits of a privilege’s scope had
to be clarified so that follow-on publishers knew what material they were free to print.
67. See PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 28-36 (describing the grant of charter and the structure
of Stationers Company).
68. Id. at 32-35.
69. See id. at 139-40 (describing the Stationers’ efforts to forestall lapse of the Printing Act).
70. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 6 (1967).
71. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 138-42 (describing the legislative process leading
to the enactment of the Statute of Anne); ROSE, supra note 29, at 33-36, 42-46 (same).
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principal agents of change leading to the creation of copyright law.72 Early
bills would have recreated a statutory right granted to the publisher. These
were met with stiff resistance, but concerns about an unregulated press
gave legislators reasons to act. By reframing the legislation as an author’s
rights bill to deflect some of the antimonopoly sentiment, and with some
backroom negotiations,73 the Stationers successfully persuaded Parliament
to enact the first copyright law, the Statute of Anne, effective April 10,
1710.74
For the Stationers, the Statute of Anne was a necessary compromise,
but many of its features endure as part of contemporary American
copyright law.75 The Statute of Anne applied to “books,” and granted
authors and their assigns the “sole liberty of Printing and Reprinting” any
book written by, or purchased from, the author.76 To obtain rights under the
Act, the book’s title had to be registered, a process that included depositing
nine copies of the book in Stationers’ Hall.77 The author could assign his

72. See, e.g., John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics: The Making of the Copyright Act of
1710, 8 PUBL’G HISTORY 19, 23 (1980) (“There is no doubt that the primary motive of the 1710
Copyright Act was to reintroduce a measure of censorship.”); PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 138-42,
151-52; SANJEK, supra note 57, at 204-05 (explaining that the term “‘conger’ . . . . came from the
eel that swallowed up all small underwater life within its reach, usually far beyond its seven- or
eight-foot length.”).
73. See JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 86 (1988) (describing the
relationship between the Tory Sir Robert Harley and Daniel Defoe in setting the stage for the
Statute of Anne).
74. “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.” 8 Ann., ch. 19
(1710), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. One reason composers and music
sellers had doubts about music’s status under the Act was that it was passed in response to petitions
from the booksellers. Another reason is that the terms of the Act appeared to be directed only at
literary authors and booksellers. See infra Part III.D.2 (describing conceptual difficulty with treating
printed music as a statutory “book”).
75. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (1994) (“The
Stationers Company ended up getting far less than it had petitioned for because Parliament, instead
of recognizing perpetual rights, passed a law limiting the exclusive right of publication to a set term
of years and containing other provisions limiting power previously enjoyed by the Stationers.”).
76. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html; cf. 17
U.S.C. § 201 (2005) (vesting copyright in the author); id. § 106 (granting a copyright owner the
exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute copies of the work).
77. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (stating that a deposit is mandatory when
registering a work unless exempted by the Register of Copyrights and that use of deposit copies
may be made by the Library of Congress). The plain language of the Act established that notice by
registration was a necessary precondition to obtain a remedy under the Act. Despite the mandatory
language, however, subsequent judicial interpretation did not condition protection on registration.
See David Hunter, Music Copyright in Britain to 1800, 67 MUSIC AND LETTERS 269, 280 (1986)
[hereinafter Hunter, Music Copyright]; cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 411 (2005) (explaining that
registration no longer is a condition of protection but is required in order to maintain an
infringement action for a U.S. work).
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statutory rights, but valid assignments were to be evidenced by a signed
and witnessed writing. 78 Once the author or publisher had secured rights,
liability for unauthorized printing or reprinting was strict; in contrast,
distributor liability required knowledge of a book’s infringing status.79
Those found to have infringed the statutory right would be liable in the
amount of one cent for each infringing copy in the defendant’s
possession.80 Some limits were placed on the exercise of copyright,81 and
the Act set an aggressive limitations period for infringement actions,
running from the time of the infringement and lasting only three months.82
The most contested feature of the Statute of Anne was its limited term
of protection, which endured “for the term of fourteen years . . . and no
longer.”83 At the end of the initial fourteen-year term, the right in the copy
would revert to the author for a second fourteen-year term.84 The
Stationers’ ultimate goal was perpetual protection. They had been able to
profit handsomely from publication of canonical works, such as those from
ancient Greece and Shakespeare’s plays, and they feared the loss of revenue
when these works would enter the newly created statutory public domain.85
Following a now-familiar pattern, the Stationers continued to lobby
Parliament for an expansion of the rights granted under the Statute of Anne
and were met with limited success.86 After 1738, when the statutory term

78. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (requiring that assignments of exclusive rights
under copyright be evidenced by a signed writing).
79. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a), 501(a) (imposing strict liability for
unauthorized exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, which include rights of reproduction,
distribution, and importation).
80. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (setting statutory damages in the range of
$750 to $30,000, with discretion to depart downward to $200 for innocent infringement and upward
to $150,000 for willful infringement). The courts apply statutory damages per work infringed rather
than per copy.
81. To check overreaching by booksellers, the Act provided that any person could bring a
complaint to a fairly long list of high government officials charging that the owner of the copy had
set the price unreasonably high. See PATRY, supra note 75, at 12. The listed officials were granted
the power to conduct an inquiry on the basis for the price, and, if the price was deemed
unreasonable, the power to set the price and order the owner of the copy to publish notice of the
newly settled price. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710).
82. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (establishing three-year limitations period).
83. See 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); Feather, supra note 72, at 36 (describing the Stationers’
disappointment with a limited term). Copyright protection in the United States constitutionally must
be for a “limited [t]ime[],” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but Congress has greatly expanded the term
of protection. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
84. See 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710); cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203 (permitting authors or heirs to terminate
copyright assignments in works other than works made for hire between thirty-five and forty years
after the grant).
85. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29, at 52.
86. See PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 154-56 (describing 1734 petition). Parliament agreed
to drop the price control provisions of the Act in 1739, see id. at 158, and it added a provision
prohibiting importation of copies in English (primarily from Irish publishers). See PATRY, supra
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expired for works initially protected under the Act, the Stationers invested
in litigation.87 The London publishers, who had come into increasing
competition with provincial and Scottish publishers, sought a means of
squelching this threat to their margins.88 In what became known as the Battle
of the Booksellers (the materialist label) or the Question of Literary Property
(the intellectualist label), the London publishers sued their rivals for
publishing works after the statutory term had expired.89 The London
publishers claimed that the Statute of Anne was merely an overlay on
common law copyright, which, they argued, was perpetual and survived
expiration of the statutory period of protection.90
This claim of perpetual copyright first reached the Court of King’s Bench
in the 1769 case of Millar v. Taylor,91 in which Lord Mansfield fashioned the
common-law, authorial right and held that the Statute of Anne did not
abolish this right.92 The opinion sparked one of the few dissents issued
during Mansfield’s thirty-year tenure as president of the court,93 and the
decision was short-lived. In 1774, the House of Lords in Donaldson v.
Becket94 ruled that no common-law right is infringed by republication of a
work whose term of protection under the Statute of Anne has expired.95 As
is discussed infra, Donaldson had a significant impact on the struggle for
composer’s copyright.96
2. Composers and Musicians
a. Artistic and Business Relations
While certain literary authors, such as Alexander Pope, asserted their
rights under the Statute of Anne relatively shortly after its enactment,97

note 75, at 12. But Parliament was unwilling to extend the term of protection. See id.; ROSE, supra
note 29, at 52-58 (describing the booksellers’ lobbying campaign).
87. See PATRY, supra note 75, at 12.
88. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 167; PATRY, supra note 75, at 13 n.30.
89. See PATRY, supra note 75, at 12.
90. Only the essential details of the fate of common-law copyright need be elucidated here,
as the tale has been oft told. E.g., AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899); FEATHER, supra note 73, at 78-83; ROSE, supra note 29, at 4-5.
See generally Trevor Ross, Copyright and the Invention of Tradition, 26 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
STUD. 1 (1992) (detailing the evolution of copyright law in eighteenth-century England).
91. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
92. See id. at 218.
93. See id. (Aston, J.).
94. 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774).
95. See id. at 258-62.
96. See infra notes 218-19, 235 and accompanying text (discussing cases affected by
Donaldson ruling).
97. See FEATHER, supra note 73, at 103.
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musical composers were far more reticent to rely on the Act.98 To
understand why this may have been, it is important to note the differences
between the two groups. Literary authors relied primarily on publication
as the means of communicating with their audience.99 By contrast, most
musical composers outside the theater still were professional performers.100
Most professional musicians and composers relied on the goodwill of
wealthy patrons for their economic survival,101 but market exchange had
begun to emerge as an alternative means to make a living. For example, the
general public also had started to become an important patron of music
through the institution of the public concert with paid admission.102 By the
early eighteenth century, the concert series had become a central part of the
aristocratic social season in London.103 Performance spaces included two
theaters operating under patent, Covent Garden and Drury Lane, as well as
pleasure gardens (i.e., public parks), such as Vauxhall and Ranelagh.104
Along with public concerts, opera was the leading entertainment for the
upper classes during the eighteenth century.105 Invented in Italy at the dawn
of the seventeenth century, this form of musical theater did not attract
serious interest or support in England until the early eighteenth century.106
Italian opera then became the rage, and opera singers, particularly

98. See CHANAN, supra note 56, at 150-51.
99. See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 6.
100. Opera remained a vibrant art form and continued to develop on the Continent and in
England. Other forms of musical theater emerged as well. For more on these developments, see
generally DONALD JAY GROUT, A SHORT HISTORY OF OPERA (3d ed. 1988) (detailing the evolution
of European opera).
101. See, e.g., MCVEIGH, supra note 55, at 203 (1993) (explaining that British musicians
“remained dependent at every turn on patrons’ support and approval, for all the outward appearance
of a new commercial environment”); DEBORAH ROHR, THE CAREERS OF BRITISH MUSICIANS, 17501850: A PROFESSION OF ARTISANS 40-61 (2001) (discussing different sources of patronage in
eighteenth-century England).
102. See REINHARD G. PAULY , MUSIC IN THE CLASSIC PERIOD 66 (4th ed. 2000).
103. See CHANAN, supra note 56, at 134.
104. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 105. The primary site for middle-class patronage of public
performance was in the pleasure garden performances. According to a contemporary account of a
1786 performance at Vauxhall Garden:
There were last night above 6000 persons present, and among them some of the
first people in the kingdom, but as is always the case at Vauxhall, it was a
melange; the cit and the courtier jostled each other with the usual familiarity; the
half guinea was no repellant to the middling order . . . .
MCVEIGH, supra note 55, at 41 (quoting from The Morning Chronicle, May 30, 1786) (emphasis
in original).
105. See ROGER FISKE, ENGLISH THEATRE MUSIC IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, at v (2d.
1986).
106. See id.
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castrati,107 were the highest paid musical performers in the land.108
Competing with Italian opera in London was the ballad opera.109 In 1728,
John Gay, a member of London’s leading literary circles, presented A
Beggar’s Opera, a musical extravaganza featuring popular songs sung in
English, parodies of Italian opera, and political satire. It was, perhaps, the
greatest theatrical success of the century in England.110
Annual music meetings also extended the range of professional musical
performance. Most of these festivals evolved within a political and
religious context;111 but improved transportation infrastructure that enabled
formation of a festival circuit and increasing financial investment
broadened these music meetings into a broad political and entertainment
mechanism.112 The growth and spread of the music festival intensified the
demand for nationally recognized singers and players.
The growth in markets for live performance fueled a growth in the
market for printed music, largely by amateurs seeking to play current
favorites at home.113 Increasing demand for printed music created new
opportunities for freelance composition,114 but for many composers,
publication of their compositions functioned as a means for increasing
demand for their public performances.115 Many composers did not even
receive a one-time payment from publishers for their compositions, as
ownership of musical manuscripts written with patronage funding appears
to have varied.116 Where composition was part of a musician’s duties under
his employment agreement, ownership in the manuscript generally vested
in the employer; however, if performance was a musician’s only musical
duty, he would be free to seek publication and retain any payment made for
the manuscript.117
See GROUT, supra note 100, at 71.
See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 97; ROHR, supra note 101, at 155-56.
See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 46.
See id. at 48.
See WILLIAM WEBER, THE RISE OF MUSICAL CLASSICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 103 (1992) (discussing the context of the evolution of the English music festival).
112. See id. (noting the political reach of the music festival). By the early eighteenth century,
such towns as Oxford, Salisbury, Winchester, Bath, Wells, and Norwich had developed similar
festivals, and by the second half of the century, festivals had spread to a wide variety of towns and
cities in most parts of England. See id. at 124-25.
113. See, e.g., SANJEK, supra note 57, at 221-35 (describing examples of successful publishers
and successful titles).
114. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 70-74 (surveying freelance composition across Europe,
including in England).
115. See CHANAN, supra note 56, at 112.
116. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 39, at 167-70 (surveying composers’ rights in their
manuscripts across Europe).
117. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 149-50 (explaining that popular music composers received
a lump-sum payment in exchange for possession of the manuscript, the right to publish being
assumed); PHLILIP G. DOWNS, CLASSICAL MUSIC : THE ERA OF HAYDN, MOZART, AND BEETHOVEN
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Musicians who sought to express themselves primarily through
composition rather than performance found their circumstances frustrating.
Unlike gentleman authors such as Pope, most musicians residing in
England were from the lower-middle ranks of society. They pursued
musical careers because they were either following in a family tradition,
taking advantage of natural talent, chasing after potential riches, or
responding to unanticipated economic hardship.118 Throughout the
eighteenth century, English-born musicians and composers competed with
foreign and immigrant musicians, who generally enjoyed greater prestige
and financial remuneration than did their English counterparts. British
composers resented the limited economic rewards for composition,
generally, and the skewed distribution of such rewards in favor of those
who wrote songs, “domestic” music, and educational pieces for sheet
music publishers.119 The only musicians able to focus solely or primarily
on composition were certain foreign composers, such as George Frideric
Handel, Johann Christian Bach, and Joseph Haydn.
Handel was the most important transitional figure, setting important
precedents for the struggle for composer’s copyright. He participated in the
markets for public performance and publication of his work and, by doing
so, helped enlarge those markets. His music supplied healthy publishing
profits, and its durable popularity was the basis for the creation of the
“classical” music canon and tradition.120Handel may have started his career
in law.121 Once his interest turned to music, he began composing operas and
was then appointed kapellmeister to George, elector of Hanover, who later
became George I of Great Britain.122 Handel had difficulty escaping his
patron, but in 1712 he settled in London, where he was given an annual
income by Queen Anne.123
In London, Handel was the first major composer to pursue freelance
composition in a serious way. Departing from the vogue for Italian opera,
Handel invented the English oratorio, the best known of which is The
Messiah.124 As both composer and impresario, Handel raised funds for his

20 (1992); SCHERER, supra note 39, at 169. Today, composers generally retain copyright in
commissioned works. See Anne Midgette, Music Fit for a King, Written for a Dentist, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2005, Arts & Leisure, at AR 1 (describing modern patronage arrangements).
118. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 27 (cataloging musicians’ motivations).
119. See id. at 141 (describing disparities in revenues among composers).
120. See generally WEBER, supra note 111 (describing creation of retrospective repertory and
“classical” music tradition).
121. See DONALD BURROWS, HANDEL 9-10 (1994).
122. See JONATHAN KEATES, HANDEL: THE MAN AND HIS MUSIC 50 (1985).
123. See CHRISTOPHER HOGWOOD, HANDEL 66-69 (1984).
124. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 110 (listing oratorios and noting that The Messiah
initially was more successful in Dublin than in London); Anthony Hicks & Gerald Abraham,
Oratorio and Related Forms, in 6 NEW OXFORD HISTORY OF MUSIC 23, 25 (Gerald Abraham ed.,
1986) (“English oratorio came into being quite suddenly with the composition and performance of
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performances from a range of sources, including individual attendance
tickets. These permitted middle class citizens who could not afford seasonal
subscriptions to become part of his audience.125 In addition, from 1720 to
1728, Handel served as musical director of London’s principal opera
company, the Royal Academy of Music.126 Handel then became partner in
managing King’s Theatre, where he continued to stage operas and other
musical performances.127
Handel’s entrepreneurialism also led him to take an interest in
publication. Initially, Handel feuded with John Walsh, London’s leading
music publisher. Walsh had been republishing Handel’s continental
publications without permission.128 Subsequently, Handel and Walsh came
to terms and they had a long-lived business relationship.129 Handel’s music
remained popular in print and in performance well after his death in 1751.
Surely, one reason for this was the music’s aesthetic appeal, but William
Weber also identifies political motivations for continued support for the
staging of Handel’s works.130 Handel’s preeminent position was signaled
by the fact that, in 1760, he became the first composer to be the subject of
a full-length biography.131
b. Publication and Copyright
From a functional-materialist perspective, the growing value of printed
music and the establishment of copyright should have led composers to
seek legal recognition as authors under the Statute of Anne. The evidence
shows that, instead, professional composers embraced copyright
reluctantly. In the years after the Statute of Anne’s enactment, successful
composers generally did not seek to assert rights by registering their new

Handel’s Esther, probably in 1718.”). For an interesting exposition of the political themes and
dimensions in Handel’s oratorios, see generally RUTH SMITH, HANDEL’S ORATORIOS AND
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT (1995).
125. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 62.
126. See id.
127. Handel faced stiff competition from 1733 to 1737 from the Opera of the Nobility until
it folded following massive losses. See id. at 99.
128. In addition to republishing Handel’s previously printed works, Walsh employed agents
to copy unpublished works. See SANJEK, supra note 57, at 211 (describing a pit musician hired by
Walsh to copy score during performances); see also id. (describing Walsh’s employment of William
Babbell, a member of the royal band with a phenomenal memory who attended Handel’s opera
Rinaldo on Walsh’s behalf and recreated from memory Handel’s musical improvisations during the
prior evening’s performance). Walsh boasted that he had earned £15,000 from Rinaldo’s music,
prompting Handel to rejoin, “Next time I will publish the opera and Walsh can write the music.”
Id. at 211-12.
129. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 277 n.31 (listing joint publications of
Handel and Walsh).
130. See WEBER, supra note 111, at 14.
131. See Peter Holman, Eighteenth-Century English Music: Past, Present, Future, in MUSIC
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 5, 7 (David Wyn Jones ed., 2000).
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compositions in Stationers’ Hall. Rather, they sought legal vindication for
proprietary claims in their music through petitions for printing privileges.
Between 1710 and 1770, the English crown granted at least sixteen
privileges to composers, and the scope of most of these extended to any
work the composer chose to publish.132 These privileges either identified
music as property or alluded to it.133 The term of protection under most
privileges was fourteen years.
One would think that copyright, which guaranteed protection without
need for a petition and which provided the author with a total of twentyeight years of protection, would have served composers’ material interests
better than printing privileges. Conceivably, privileges may have been
preferable to composers because privileges often provided ex ante
protection to all of the composer’s works whereas copyright was effective
on a per-work basis and normally did not vest until registration and deposit
took place. Alternatively, royal privileges may have been a valuable status
signal that would not have been easily sacrificed in favor of copyright.134
Finally, if composers would have had difficulty obtaining deposit copies,
privileges may have been more attractive. I was unable to locate evidence
of explicit deliberation along these lines. Instead, certain composers
eventually did embrace copyright as a form of legal hedge, and it was
through this indirect route that they eventually won the struggle over music
copyright.
3. Music Sellers and Publishing Music
In contrast to professional musicians and their equivocal response to the
Statute of Anne, music publishers appear to have been hostile toward
music copyright. At first glance, this response is surprising given that the
music sellers’ colleagues in the Company of Stationers had been largely

132. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 277. Privileges were granted to Handel
(1720); William Croft (1724); William Thomson (1733); Handel and Walsh (1739); T.A. Arne
(1741); Maurice Greene (1742); John Stanley (1742); Samuel Howard (1744); William Boyce
(1745); Thomas Vincent (1748); Count de Saint Germain (1749); Niccolo Pasquali (1750); John
Worgan (1755); C.F. Abel (1760); Handel and Walsh (1760); J.C. Bach (1763); Joseph Kelway
(1764); John Burton (1766); and J.C. Fischer (1770). Id. at 277 n.51; David Hunter, More Musical
Privileges, in 68 MUSIC & LETTERS 210 (1987) (acknowledging H. Watton’s contribution in
identifying three of these privileges).
133. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 277. Often composers would give notice
of their privileges in music books or through public advertisements. For example, John Worgan,
a composer of many songs performed at Vauxhall Garden, included the following notice in an
advertisement of his Vauxhall ballads of 1755: “No single balled can be wrote out or printed from
this book, the author having been to the expense of obtaining the King’s royal licence to prevent
the Music shop keepers and others doing him so great an Injury, it being no less than robbing him
of his property.” John A. Parkinson, Pirates and Publishers . . ., 58 PERFORMING RIGHT 20, 21
(1972) (quoting from The Public Advertiser, June 26, 1755).
134. I thank Jessica Litman for this observation.
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responsible for the invention of copyright. On second look, however, the
music publishers’ reaction is understandable because they were situated
differently from the Stationers, both legally and economically.
Legally, music sellers continued to be eligible for royal printing
patents.135 By the end of the seventeenth century, music publishing had
become a distinct subspecialty in the publishing business, and music
publications largely were not subject to registration and control by the
Stationers.136 Thus, the lapse of the Printing Act in 1694, which had
spurred the Stationers to action, had been something of a boon for music
publishers because it reduced the burden of state censorship while leaving
the prospect of exclusive economic rights intact.
Economically, music sellers cared less about legal protection than did
booksellers because they made most of their income from selling
contemporary works for which lead time was more important than
exclusive rights for appropriating the value of new music.137 By contrast,
literary publishers relied on their backlists to supply a steady stream of
revenues.138 (Coincidentally, during the period of competition, changes in

135. Queen Elizabeth had granted the first Letters Patent for music printing in 1575 to the
leading composers of their day, William Byrd and Thomas Tallis. See GUSTAVE REESE , MUSIC IN
THE RENAISSANCE 784-85 (1954). They received a twenty-one-year monopoly on music printing.
See JOSEPH KERMAN , THE ELIZABETHAN MADRIGAL 258 (1962) (“Tallis and Byrd were given the
first privilege for the printing of ‘pricksong’ in 1575 . . . .”). After ten years, Tallis died, and the
privilege was assigned to another publisher, who further sublicensed his publishing rights. See
REESE , supra, at 787; KERMAN , supra, at 258. The only line of their business that was profitable,
however, was blank music paper for use by the hand copyists. See Iain Fenlon & John Milsom,
“Ruled Paper Imprinted”: Music Paper and Patents in Sixteenth-Century England, 37 J. AM.
MUSICOLOGICAL SOC’Y 139, 140-41 (1984) (“[T]he Byrd-Tallis patent seems not to have been a
commercial success . . . .”). Music publishers faced competition from “scribal” publishers—human
copyists—well into the nineteenth century. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 161-66 (describing
competition between copyists and publishers in Germany); see also generally HAROLD LOVE, THE
SCRIBAL PUBLICATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1993) (describing the process of
scribal literary publication).
For the first half of the seventeenth century, psalm books, covered by a separate patent, were
the only profitable line in music publishing, and that patent came within control of the Stationers.
See Hunter, supra note 77, at 270-71. The Byrd-Tallis music patent had been allowed to lapse in
1613. See D.W. KRUMMEL, ENGLISH MUSIC PRINTING 1553-1700, 32 (1975) (noting that between
1613 and 1650 scarcely two dozen books were issued that might have come within the scope of the
music patent). During the balance of the seventeenth century, individuals sought a royal privilege
for only two books containing music, and the music was not an important contributor to either
book’s economic value. See Hunter, supra note 77, at 271. George Wither’s patent on his HYMNS
AND SONGS OF THE CHURCH was controversial because the patent broadly required that Wither’s
book be bound with every metrical psalm book published. Id. Not surprisingly, the Stationers
protested and commenced legal action to reconcile Wither’s rights with theirs under the psalm-book
patent. Id.
136. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 271.
137. See id. at 276 (describing the economics of music publishing).
138. See id. at 272, 276 (describing the market for book publishing).
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printing technology made publishing and distribution of popular music
even cheaper.139) Music sellers also had reason to be skeptical about the
economic value of legal rights. Even when music was subject to a royal
printing privilege, music publishers’ claims of right did little to thwart
unauthorized publication.140 Even well-established publishers engaged in
unauthorized reproduction of previously-published works.141
Consequently, success in the music publishing business required speed,
an acute sense for changing tastes, and little regard for proprietary claims
of rivals or composers.142 This pattern for success was first established by
John Playford, who became the dominant music publisher between 1650
and 1684 because he knew how to cater to the growing middle class
audience.143 New engraving techniques made it economical to publish
individual song sheets and to sell them for a few pennies,144 and by the end
of the century, engraving had become the dominant technique for music
publishing.145 Not only did this development make printed music more
widely accessible, but it also better served consumers, who previously had
been forced to purchase an entire book in order to obtain the one song they
truly desired.146
During the eighteenth century, the value of printed music continued to
increase as Londoners became more wealthy, the size of the national
139. Printers used a European innovation dating back to 1660 using short, steel rods shaped
at one end into musical characters and letters of the alphabet and for the heads of notes, clefs, time
signatures, or other symbols, and for the words of songs. See SANJEK, supra note 57, at 167. Other
details were added with etcher’s tools. See id.
140. See Parkinson, supra note 133, at 20 (“It is clear that the music shops maintained a wellorganised trade in pirated copies, printed or manuscript.”); David Hunter, The Publishing of Opera
and Song Books in England, 1703-1726, in 47 NOTES 647, 657 (1991) [hereinafter Hunter, The
Publishing of Opera] (finding that 10% (18 out of 180) of songbooks published between 1703 and
1726 were republished in “competitive editions,” i.e., without authorization of author or first
publisher).
141. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 117, at 22 (“Piracy in publishing yielded profits as great as
those from legitimate business, and many respectable publishing houses turned to it from time to
time. . . .”); Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 276-77 (“Though some publishers might
advertise their disapproval of unauthorized editions . . . the activity was profitable enough for most
to practise it.”).
142. See, e.g., Adam Carse, THE ORCHESTRA IN THE XVIIITH CENTURY 8-9 (1940) (describing
the importance of lead time and arguing that “[i]f any law held good, it was the law of the jungle”).
143. See MUSIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 92 (D.W. Krummel & Stanley Sadie eds., 1990)
(describing Playford as “the first great promoter among music publishers” because he “sensed the
distinctive spirit of England’s middle-class audience”).
144. See SANJEK, supra note 57, at 163; see also SCHERER, supra note 39, at 159 (describing
the evolution of engraving techniques).
145. See LORENZO BIANCONI, MUSIC IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 79 (David Bianconi
trans., Cambridge University Press 1987) (1982); SCHERER, supra note 39, at 159.
146. See SANJEK, supra note 57, at 163. The keen reader will notice the parallel between this
technological development and the arrival of digital distribution, which also puts pressure on the
bundled album format.
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population grew, music literacy increased, and the shelf life of printed
music increased with the invention of classical music.147 The story of
Handel’s publisher, John Walsh, illustrates the bare-knuckles tactics music
publishers used to succeed in the early eighteenth century. Walsh entered
the market in 1695, when he introduced inexpensive instruction books for
instruments found in the home.148 Using techniques such as employing a
set of agents who sent him the latest publications from the Netherlands as
soon as they came off the press,149 Walsh quickly reproduced these and
other unauthorized editions for sale in London at considerably lower prices
before authorized publishers could offer their editions.150 Walsh was able
to issue new songs on a weekly basis and advertised them as a regular
feature in his shop.151 Most of Walsh’s publications were printed without
the permission of the composers.152 Walsh’s financial success was due to
a combination of good business judgment153 and the use of less savory
tactics, such as misleading advertising, predatory pricing, and “legal
manoeuvres” to thwart competition.154 The strategy bore financial success,
as evidenced by the £30,000 value of his estate and the ongoing business
taken up by his son who also profited, leaving an estate worth £40,000.155
From the functional-materialist perspective, then, it is not surprising
that even after the booksellers’ investment in copyright legislation paid off,
the music sellers chose not to make the investments necessary to transition
147. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 33.
148. See SANJEK, supra note 57, at 167. Walsh was able to finance his publishing venture in
part from income earned as the exclusive supplier of musical instruments to the military. See id.
149. See id. at 169. Walsh’s practice resembled that of other leading publishers, who entered
into agreements with composers or patrons through agents who acted both as distributors of already
published music and as talent scouts for new music. See Sarah Adams, International Dissemination
of Printed Music During the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century, in DISSEMINATION OF MUSIC :
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF MUSIC PUBLISHING 30 (Hans Lenneburg ed., 1994) (“Many of the larger
publishing houses had agents in other cities, both to sell music and to facilitate acquisition of new
music to send back for publication.”). Publishers also agreed to print each other’s catalog locally.
See id. at 31 (“The evidence that has surfaced thus far suggests that this was a well-developed
means of transmission. . . . Publishers in business with one another arranged for the reciprocal sale
of publications, exchanged plates, and exchanged each others’ engravings, to which they added
their own title pages.”).
150. See Adams, supra note 149; MUSIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING, supra note 143, at 101
(describing Walsh’s catalog as “songsheets (sometimes collected into periodical series) and works
of other publishers which he sold at his shop”).
151. SANJEK, supra note 57, at 168-69. In 1703, the Walsh catalog boasted ninety-two items
and increased dramatically through the years. Id. at 169.
152. See id. at 170.
153. See, e.g., id. at 207 (“Walsh kept in touch with new trends that might affect the business,
particularly the rebirth of interest in social dancing.”). Using production economies, Walsh was able
to diversify his inventory to serve a variety of tastes. See id. at 206 (stating that, by 1720, Walsh’s
catalog included more than 600 editions).
154. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 273.
155. See id. at 275.
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from printing privilege to copyright. Moreover, even if the prospect of
copyright had been economically attractive, music publishers would have
had reason to doubt that they could rely on registration in Stationers’ Hall
as a means to secure rights. The Statute of Anne applied to “books,” and
it was uncertain whether Parliament intended the Act to do anything more
than regulate literary works.156 Reinforcing a limited view of copyright’s
scope is the fact that William Hogarth, a famous artist-engraver, along with
others, separately petitioned Parliament for protection for engraved
works.157 Implicit in the petition was a view that engraved works of visual
art were not “books” within the meaning of the Statute of Anne, and
Parliament apparently agreed because it passed the Engravers’ Copyright
of 1735 better known as Hogarth’s Act.158 One music publisher apparently
believed that the Engraving Act was a closer fit than copyright for music,
and he issued warnings citing the Engraving Act in his publications.159
Whether the music sellers were irrational in overlooking the Statute of
Anne is too hard to judge from this distance in time. The trade-offs for
them would have been the benefit of automatic availability of protection
under the Statute of Anne weighed against the theoretically increased
bargaining power that the Statute would have conferred upon composers.
I was unable to find any evidence that music sellers explicitly debated this
choice, but from their actions we can infer that they preferred to rely on
printing privileges and competitive edge. Music historian David Hunter
draws a stronger inference and charges that music publishers “actively
denied composers their copyright.”160 What we know is that most music
publishers carried on as if the Act did not apply to music and as if composers
had no initial entitlement to control reproduction of their work.161 After
passage of the Statute of Anne, very few music publishers registered their
works in Stationers’ Hall (about two percent of registrations), and those
works that were registered tended to be published by letter press or were selfpublished engraved works.162

156. See 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710).
157. See PATRY, supra note 75, at 36 n.108.
158. 8 Geo. II, ch. 13 (1735); see Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 278 (describing
the Act as protecting only engravers who also were the designers of their prints); David Hunter,
Copyright Protection for Engravings and Maps in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 9 LIBRARY 128
(1987); PATRY, supra note 75, at 36 n.108 (same).
159. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 278. Although the Act may not have been
“tested” insofar as a court may not have ruled on the applicability of the Engraving Act to printed
music, in one case the composer Thomas Augustine Arne asserted rights under the Act against
music sellers, who joined the issue in their answer. See infra Part III.B.3.
160. Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 278.
161. See id. at 274 (“As far as the trade was aware, until 1777 music was not protected by the
Act of Anne. . . .”).
162. See id. at 278 (reporting on registrations from 1710 to 1780).
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B. The Struggle for Composer’s Copyright
With the background set, we can see how the struggle for composer’s
copyright had both material and ideological dimensions. Materially,
composers sought greater economic independence and sought a share of the
growing publishing revenue stream as a means to achieve that goal. The
more successful and better connected composers sought and obtained royal
printing privileges for their music rather than asserting rights under
copyright. Ideologically, these composers increasingly saw themselves as
entitled to reap the financial rewards from their intellectual labor and sought
a share of the increasing respect and social standing that other intellectual
laborers, such as literary authors, were beginning to enjoy.
These composers soon found themselves in conflict with the London
music sellers, who, under the competitive pressures of a relatively
unregulated market, were not inclined to respect any claims of royal
privilege, whether they be made by rival publishers or composers. Relatively
recent research by musicologists and literary historians has revealed that the
struggle for composer’s copyright played out in a sporadic series of cases
during the course of the century and in public advertisements by composers
warning against unauthorized publication of their works. The dearth of case
law is not surprising. Composers generally lacked the resources and will to
pursue litigation, and even publishers who had received a printing privilege
relied primarily on their lead-time advantage to profit from publication.163
The few cases that were litigated offer unique insight into music’s
conflicted relationship with copyright.
1. Gay v. Read
One of the earliest cases brought by an author under the Statute of Anne
involved music but did not directly implicate the question of composer’s
copyright. In 1728, John Gay had composed a sequel to The Beggar’s
Opera entitled Polly. Sensitive to Gay’s satirical wit, the government
censored the work’s performance but did not suppress its printing.164 Gay,
recognizing the publicity value of censorship, quickly enlisted a printer,
and he self-published a total of 10,500 copies of the music and words
bound together.165 Having no doubt that he was an author, and that his
Polly was a book within the meaning of Statute of Anne, Gay had the title

163. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rabin & Steven Zohn, Arne, Handel, Walsh, and Music as
Intellectual Property: Two Eighteenth-Century Lawsuits, in 120 J. OF THE ROYAL MUSICAL ASS’N
112, 116 (1995) (“[T]he popularity of most musical compositions was ephemeral, and the cost of
legal proceedings prohibitive, composers and music booksellers rarely engaged in extended court
battles.”).
164. See James R. Sutherland, Polly Among the Pirates, 37 MODERN LANG. REV. 291, 291
(1942).
165. Id.
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entered in the Stationers’ Register about the time of first printing.166
Consistent with the functional-materialist account, the ready profits to be
made from satisfying public curiosity about the banned work tempted many
booksellers to put Gay’s copyright to the test.167 At least four unauthorized
editions of Polly were for sale in London within less than a month.168 Gay
quickly filed suit in Chancery and received a preliminary injunction against
more than twenty printers and booksellers three months later.169 Apparently
none of the defendants denied that Polly was within the subject matter of the
Statute of Anne, as defendant booksellers would later do when accused of
infringing only musical compositions.170 With his short lead time, higher
quality edition, and the protection afforded by the injunction, Gay managed to
clear a £1,000 profit on his publication.171
2. Geminiani v. Walsh
The earliest case in which a composer may have claimed copyright in
solely a musical composition sheds more light on business relations in music
publishing than on whether the Statute of Anne supplied a basis for a
conceptual shift concerning rights in music. According to an account published
in 1776, the composer Francesco Geminiani sued publisher John Walsh, Sr.
in 1731 or 1732.172 Walsh precipitated the action by having surreptitiously
obtained a manuscript of an opera by Geminiani.173 Walsh was set to publish
the opera when he decided it could be made more valuable if it incorporated
Geminiani’s edits.174 Walsh contacted Geminiani and threatened to publish the
manuscript “as is” unless Geminiani corrected it. Geminiani filed suit in
Chancery seeking an injunction instead.175 We do not know Geminiani’s legal
theory because the case did not proceed very far. Hawkins reports that Walsh
“compounded the matter” (i.e., settled the case), and “the work was published
under the inspection of the author.”176 Reportedly, Geminiani’s distaste from
the episode helped propel him to begin engraving and publishing his own

166. Id. at 293 n.4.
167. Id. at 291-92.
168. Id. at 292.
169. Id.
170. Professor Sutherland based his article on his reading of the defendants’ answers to Gay’s
complaint, and he almost certainly would have mentioned any defense that contested Gay’s
copyright on subject matter grounds.
171. Sutherland, supra note 164, at 291.
172. See SIR JOHN HAWKINS, 2 A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF MUSIC
850 (Charles Cudworth ed., Dover Publications 1963) (1853).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Walsh subsequently published Geminiani’s Opera terza and advertised “that he came
honestly by the copy.” Id.
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works.177
3. Arne v. Roberts and Johnson
Thomas Augustine Arne is the first composer known to have asserted
rights under the Statute of Anne, however obliquely, in Arne v. Roberts
and Johnson.178 Arne is an important transitional figure in the struggle for
composer’s copyright. He wrote primarily for the theater, becoming the
leading English theatrical composer after Handel’s death in 1751. Arne
wrote pleasing melodies incorporated into many comic and ballad operas
and some popular nationalist works. However, his larger ambition to
fashion a hybrid of English opera in the “Italian style” generally failed.179
By all accounts, Arne was an unpleasant person in both his familial and
commercial relations.180 Some of his prickly qualities, however, also gave
him reason to be a risk-taking individual, and consequently, he was both
a legal and a commercial entrepreneur. Choosing to be an English theater
composer at a time when Italian opera still dominated the London stages
was inherently risky. 181 Theater managers paid freelance immigrant
composers a sum for their manuscript and a share of the nightly receipts.182
Freelance English theater composers were lucky to be paid anything for
their manuscripts.183 Arne, for example, received only £60 for his most
successful theatrical work, Artaxerxes.184 English theater composers hoped
to reap financial rewards through publishing revenues from music made
popular on the stage.185
177. See ENRICO CARERI, FRANCESCO GEMINIANI (1687-1762), at 24 (1993).
178. Arne’s Bill of Complaint, Arne v. Roberts and Johnson, C11/2260/7 London Public
Record Office (1741), reprinted in Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 135-37 [hereinafter Arne’s
Bill of Complaint].
179. Only one of these works, Artaxerxes, succeeded. Interestingly, although Arne positioned
himself as a Romantic genius in litigation, his lasting influence was as a compiler. For example, his
Love in a Village (1762) combined old ballad opera idiom with Italian pasticcio, which brought
together arias by a number of composers into one opera and “started a vogue for English pastiche
operas that lasted well into the nineteenth century.” See Holman, supra note 131, at 11.
180. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURDEN, GARRICK, ARNE AND THE MASQUE OF ALFRED: A CASE
STUDY IN NATIONAL, THEATRICAL AND MUSICAL POLITICS (1994) (suggesting Arne’s personality
caused conflicts); see also Roger Slade, 18th Century English Music, Thomas Arne (1710-1778),
at http://www.rslade.btinternet.co.uk/arne/index.html (last visited July 10, 2005).
181. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 146.
182. See id.
183. See id. During most of the eighteenth century, composers had to look to the librettist for
payment. See FISKE, supra note 105, at 262 (“By custom the author was given the takings of the
third, sixth, and ninth nights, and out of these he usually had to pay the performers and orchestra
as well as his composer.”); id. at 295.
184. See id. at 148; see also infra note 257 and accompanying text (describing litigation
involving unauthorized publication of Artaxerxes).
185. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 146; Hunter, The Publishing of Opera, supra note 140, at
647, 655 (stating that composers began to sell opera scores to publishers in the early eighteenth
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Arne self-published and, therefore, had particular reason to guard his
publishing revenues from unauthorized reproduction. Moreover, he was
unusually well equipped to do so. Growing up as a member of the
“middling sort,”186 Arne had been positioned to pursue one of the practical
professions. His father had directed him toward a career in law, and he
spent three years as an apprentice.187 During his apprenticeship, however,
Arne pursued musical training on the sly. 188 After discovering his son
conducting an amateur group, Arne’s father relented and allowed him to
pursue his vocation.189
Arne readily put his legal training to use, for he was notoriously
litigious.190 As a composer and a businessman with legal training, Arne
was in a unique position to pursue the cause of composer’s copyright. He
did, although his chosen means indicates the uncertain relation between
printed music and the Statute of Anne. As his own publisher, Arne could
have asserted rights simply by having the titles of his new works entered
into the Stationers’ Register. He did not do so and instead petitioned the
Crown for a royal privilege, which he received in January 1741.191 The
privilege for fourteen years extended to “‘several Works, Consisting of
Vocal and Instrumental Musick’” composed with “‘great Study, Labour
and Expence.’”192 Arne then placed an advertisement warning that “the
author has procur’d his Majesty’s royal license for the sole printing and
publishing of his works, whoever shall print or sell any Work of the
author’s without his approbation or consent, will be prosecuted according

century); (describing process and prospects of obtaining publishing income for theater composers).
The unreliable nature of publishing income forced many composers to find other sources. Like
many composers and musicians, Arne taught music. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 147.
186. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 7 (explaining the social hierarchy of professions and
professionals in eighteenth-century England).
187. See Slade, supra note 180 (describing Arne’s early career).
188. Arne took private violin lessons, practiced on a spinet with muffled strings, and attended
the opera dressed as a servant. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 26 (quoting C.F. ABDY WILLIAMS, A
SHORT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEGREES IN MUSIC AT OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE , WITH A
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF GRADUATES . . . FROM THE YEAR 1463, at 87-88 (1894)).
189. Id. Musical inclination must have been strong in the family, for Arne’s sister, Susannah
Cibber, also became a well-known singer. See, e.g., Slade, supra note 180.
190. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 117 (“‘[A]ll the [theatre] managers knowing [Arne]
to be a more regular bred attorney than Musician, took care to tie him neck & heels in all contracts
otherwise he [would] not have been kept honest by his own principles & probity.’”) (quoting
ROGER LONSDALE, DR. CHARLES BURNEY 18 (1965)). Arne also was a defendant in a copyright
case. See generally Judith Milhous & Robert D. Hume, Librettist v. Composer: The Property Rights
to Arne’s Henry and Emma and Don Saverio, 122 J. OF ROYAL MUSICAL ASS’N 52 (1997)
(describing the case in which Arne borrowed six-line lyric).
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting VOCAL MELODY: AN ENTIRE NEW COLLECTION OF ENGLISH SONGS AND A
CANTATA, at i (1749)); Arne’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 178, at 135.
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to law.”193
London music publishers Henry Roberts and John Johnson each had
published some of Arne’s works immediately prior to the issue of the
privilege (and Johnson published a few immediately thereafter), and both
continued to sell their publications after having notice of Arne’s
privilege.194 The works in suit were eight songs, six from Arne’s popular
masque (the English version of ballet) Comus, and two from his incidental
music to Shakespeare’s As You Like It.195
We do not know the outcome of the case because Arne apparently did
not pursue it to judgment. The pleadings demonstrate that Arne, relying
principally on his royal privilege, hedged his position by also asserting
claims under the Statute of Anne and the Engraving Act.196 With regard to
Arne’s claim under his privilege, Roberts and Johnson questioned the
continued legitimacy of the royal printing privilege by refusing to admit
that Arne had any legal rights thereunder.197 Even if Arne had such rights,
they argued that those rights were prospective, applying only to
publications printed after the privilege had been issued and not to
subsequent sales of previously printed editions.198 Because they had printed
their versions of Arne’s songs prior to the grant of privilege, Roberts and
Johnson “insist[ed] that nothing which was done by these Defendants or
by either of them before that day can be deemed an Infringement of any
right thereby granted to the Complainant.”199
In response to Arne’s assertion of statutory rights, Roberts and Johnson
argued that (1) neither the Statute of Anne nor the Engraving Act applied
to printed music;200 (2) if either Act did apply, Arne’s suit was barred
because he had failed to follow the required procedures under each Act;201
193. Parkinson, supra note 133, at 20 (quoting London Daily Post, and General Advertiser,
Mar. 9, 1741).
194. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 117-18.
195. See id. at 119. Roberts had published some of these without Arne’s consent between
August 1739 and January 1741 in a serial song collection entitled Calliope or English Harmony.
Johnson published some of Arne’s songs from Comus and As You Like It as single sheets before and
after Arne had received his privilege. Id.
196. See Arne’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 178, at 135-37.
197. See Answer of Roberts and Johnson, Arne v. Roberts and Johnson, C/11/2260/7 London
Public Record Office (1741), reprinted in Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 140 [hereinafter
Answer of Roberts and Johnson].
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. With regard to the copyright claim, they answered: “[T]he Musick [sic] and Songs
published by the Complainant are not such Books as are by the said Act intended to be preserved
to the Author for the Encouragement of Learning. . . .” See Answer of Roberts and Johnson, supra
note 197, at 139. With regard to the Engraving Act claim, they responded that the Act applied only
to “Historical and other prints in Mezzotinto or Chiaro Oscuro and not to Musick [sic], Songs or
Ballads. . . .” See id.
201. With regard to the copyright claim, they alleged that Arne had not entered his copyright
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and (3) even if Arne had complied with procedural prerequisites, the threemonth limitations period had run under both statutes.202
4. Other Equity Actions
By the early 1770s, the pressure to resolve the question of music
copyright had begun to grow. Nancy Mace, having searched London’s
Public Record Office, has identified four equity actions after Arne’s that
implicated the question of music copyright.203 In three of these, the
librettist Isaac Bickerstaff sued to enjoin publication of music from two of
his operas.204 In the first, Bickerstaff sued over an unauthorized print run
of 1,500 copies of songs, adapted for German flute, from his comic opera,
Maid of the Mill.205 Bickerstaff alleged that the defendant had received
profits of more than £150.206 In his complaint, Bickerstaff lied and claimed
to have composed and adapted the music himself, apparently believing
these allegations necessary to maintain an action.207 Changing tacks, in his
latter two suits Bickerstaff claimed to have acquired rights through an
employment relationship because he had had his libretto for The Padlock
“set to Musick under his own directions and instructions” and had arranged
to have the music “engraved printed and published as a separate work and
distinct from the said Comic Opera under the Title of The Padlock a Comic
Opera.”208
Consistent with the functional-materialist account, we see the rising value
of private performance, as reflected in the sale of popular songs adapted for
use in the home, which inspired composers and publishers to invest greater
resources in litigation over the rising surplus. The plaintiffs in these actions
increasingly came to rely on the Statute of Anne as the source of exclusive
rights. In the last of the suits identified by Mace, the music seller John
Johnson, who had denied the existence of music copyright when defending
the action brought by Arne, asserted rights possibly under the Statute of
in the Stationers’ Register and had not deposited the required nine copies. See id. With regard to
the Engraving Act claim, they alleged that Arne had not engraved his name on each plate or had not
printed it on each print. See id.
202. See id. at 139-40.
203. See generally Nancy A. Mace, Music and English Copyright before 1773: Applications
of the Act of Anne to Music Before Bach v. Longman, Lecture for the Society of the History of
Authorship, Readers, and Publishers (July 17, 2001) (unpublished lecture, on file with author).
204. See id. at 2-6.
205. See id. at 2-3.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 3, 5 (asserting that it was well known that Samuel Arnold was the composer).
208. Id. at 6-7. In his complaints, Bickerstaff was vague about the source of law on which he
relied. Id. He did not name the composer, the popular Charles Didbin, nor did he assert that he had
received a written assignment of copyright from Didben as the Statute of Anne required. Id. He did,
however, appear to rely on the act by expressly waiving any claims for statutory damages, as was
common to do in equity suits under the Act. See id. at 7.
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Anne.209 He sued the harpsichordist Robert Falkener for printing music by
Arne and Didbin to which Johnson claimed to have purchased the rights
from the composers, evidenced by written receipts. Without hearing from
Falkener, the court issued a preliminary injunction until Falkener answered
the complaint. Falkener let the matter drop.210
5. Pyle v. Falkener
One reason Falkener may have done so is that he was embroiled in a
different suit, one which may well be the first in which a court awarded
permanent relief for infringement of music copyright. In Pyle v.
Falkener,211 John Pyle, a surgeon, filed suit in his capacity as sole executor
of music publisher John Walsh, Jr.’s estate against Falkener for
unauthorized publication of a variety of profitable works, seeking an
injunction and an accounting of Falkener’s profits from infringing sales.212
As executor, Pyle’s role was simply to liquidate the assets of the estate,
ultimately valued at £40,000.213
Walsh, Jr. had acquired by contract manuscripts from many of the most
popular composers of the day, including Thomas Arne, Maurice Green,
Isaac Bickerstaff, and George Frideric Handel.214 Some of the works by
Handel had been published more than twenty-eight years prior to
Falkener’s publication, which meant that they could not be protected by the
Statute of Anne. But, Walsh, Jr. had obtained a royal privilege in 1760 that
extended to a broad range of Handel’s vocal and instrumental works.215
The scope of the privilege was broader than the rights granted by the
Statute of Anne because it included a prohibition on abridgment as well as
on republication and distribution of copies of the protected works.216
Filing the suit in 1771, Pyle relied on royal privilege, common law
copyright, and, perhaps, the Statute of Anne as the legal bases for his
complaint.217 With respect to the claim for common-law copyright, Pyle

209. See id. at 8-9.
210. See id.
211. Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Rabin &
Zohn, supra note 163, at 140.
212. Id. at 142.
213. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 273.
214. The works in suit were excerpts from Arne’s opera, Thomas and Sally, Arne and
Bickerstaff’s opera, Love in a Village, Greene’s Six English Songs six Overtures for ye Violins in
eight parts, and eleven of Handel’s works, including five of his by-then-canonical oratorios. For
the full listing of the works in suit and the dates of Walsh’s contracts with the composers, see Rabin
& Zohn, supra note 163, at 127-29.
215. See id. at 130. Walsh had received an earlier privilege covering Handel’s work that had
expired seven years earlier. Id.
216. Cf. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710).
217. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 130-31.
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sought a stay in 1773 to await the outcome in Donaldson v. Beckett.218
After Donaldson laid perpetual copyright to rest, there was little doubt that
the common-law claims had been nullified.219 The Statute of Anne was the
only remaining basis for the claims concerning the works by Arne, Green,
and Bickerstaff.
With respect to Walsh’s printing privilege, Falkener argued that it had
been fraudulently obtained because all of the works covered by it had been
published previously. 220 Falkener denied liability for the other works on the
grounds that Bickerstaff had not composed the music attributed to him and
that musical compositions were not copyrightable.221 The opinion is an
enigma because after a long recitation of the facts and arguments before
him, Lord Apsley expressed no opinion on the merits other than by
entering a partial judgment in Pyle’s favor, granting him an injunction with
respect to the works of Handel, Arne, and Bickerstaff.222 The most
reasonable inference from the court’s ruling is that the privilege was
enforceable with respect to the works by Handel, and the Statute of Anne
applied to the remaining works.223 By refusing to grant relief for the works
composed by Green, written sometime prior to their assignment in 1744,224
the court essentially declared these to be in the public domain.
C. Composer’s Copyright—Bach v. Longman
The increasing economic value of printed music suggests one reason
why composers invested in litigation against publishers; but, for present
purposes, the question is whether an increase in the value of printed music
inspired investment in litigation or lobbying to bring music within the
Statute of Anne. The evidence is mixed. The lawsuit brought by Johann
Christian Bach and Karl Friedrich Abel that ultimately led to resolution of
the struggle for composer’s copyright in England was not filed originally
for that purpose.
Bach and Abel were immigrant entrepreneurs drawn to London’s
growing markets for music. Bach was the youngest son and eighteenth
child of Johann Sebastian Bach. After having been taught and launched
into a musical career by his father and older brother, Carl Phillip
Emmanuel Bach, Johann Christian went to Italy, where he ultimately

218. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (describing the Battle of the Booksellers
and Donaldson).
219. The judge in Pyle was Lord Chancellor Apsley, who had been one of the vocal Lords
opposed to perpetual common-law copyright. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 131-32.
220. See id. at 130.
221. See Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Robin
& Zohn, supra note 163, at 144 (reciting defenses in Falkener’s answer).
222. See id. at 145.
223. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 132.
224. See id.
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served as organist to the Milan Cathedral in 1760.225 Two years later he
traveled to London, where he became known as the “English” Bach to
distinguish him from his distinguished father and siblings.226 He served as
music master to the Queen of England, in which capacity Bach befriended
the child prodigy, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, who had come to perform
for the Queen and who admired and was influenced by Bach’s
compositional style.227 Bach composed “serious operas” and “delightful
arias,” making him a popular composer in London.228 Abel was a composer
and renowned performer on the viola da gamba. Having studied with
Bach’s father earlier in life, Abel moved to London in 1759, where he
became chamber musician to the Queen.229
Among their entrepreneurial activities, Bach and Abel launched in 1765
what became the most popular concert series of the day at Vauxhall
Gardens.230 Initially, they enjoyed economic and social success. With
respect to music publishing, each composer had obtained a printing
privilege from the English Crown for his respective music.231 Both men
had come into conflict with the publishing firm Longman & Lukey.232 This
conflict occurred during a period when both men were enjoying financial
success.233 By agreement, Bach filed the suit against Longman in Chancery,
seeking injunctive relief based on his royal printing priviliege, which had

225. See id. Within the Bach family, the women generally gave up their careers when they
wed. The exception was J. C. Bach’s wife, the soprano Cecilia Grassi, who had a long professional
career. See Barbara Garvey Jackson, Musical Women of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
in WOMEN & MUSIC : A HISTORY 99 (Karen Pendle ed., 2001).
226. See KARL GEIRINGER, THE BACH FAMILY: SEVEN GENERATIONS OF CREATIVE GENIUS
409, 411 (1954) (stating that Bach traveled to England in 1762 and served as music master to
Queen Charlotte). Apparently due to his time spent in London, Johann Christian Bach became
known as the London, or English, Bach. See id. at 418, 442.
227. See id. at 411-12. In his first year under the employment of Queen Charlotte, J. C. Bach
arranged for the appearance of both Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and his sister, Nannerl, at
Buckingham House. Id. at 411. Bach was to become friends with the prodigal Mozart, and together,
they would perform musical stunts that endeared them to their audiences. Id. For instance, Bach
would have Mozart on his lap while they played the harpsichord together, and they would either
alternate every other bar, or would compose fugues, with Bach starting and Mozart completing. Id.
at 411-12.
228. See GEIRINGER, supra note 226, at 412-13.
229. Id.
230. See MCVEIGH, supra note 55, at 14-15; SCHERER, supra note 39, at 59.
231. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 278-79.
232. Longman had been apprenticed to John Johnson and had purchased the right to use his
trademark, the Harp and Crown. See John Small, J.C. Bach Goes to Law, 126 MUSICAL TIMES 526,
526 (1985).
233. In 1773, when Bach filed his suit, he had £4,000 in the bank. SCHERER, supra note 39,
at 175 (citing HEINZ GÈARTNER, JOHN CHRISTIAN BACH: MOZART’S FRIEND AND MENTOR 299
(Reinhard G. Pauly trans., 1994)).
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longer to run than Abel’s.234
1. Bach v. Longman
Bach’s royal privilege was the legal basis for his suit, but he understood
that this foundation was eroding. 235 One would have expected Bach to
hedge his legal risk, as Arne had done previously, by adding claims under
the Statute of Anne and common-law copyright. However, Bach’s lawyer
filed two bills of complaint, both of which relied principally on Bach’s
printing privilege and possibly on a claim of common-law copyright but
made no mention of the Statute of Anne.236
During the pendency of the lawsuit, Bach and Abel changed strategy
and made specific investments designed to bring music within the Statute
of Anne. The case was moving slowly. When the House of Lords decided
Donaldson in 1774, Bach saw his common-law claims effectively denied.
Bach and Abel responded with a two-pronged strategy: they pursued the
lawsuit while also joining the London booksellers in petitioning Parliament
to overturn Donaldson. Specifically, Bach and Abel’s petition sought
clarification that musical compositions were within the scope of the Statute
of Anne.237 This was the first investment by professional composers aimed
specifically at rendering music copyrightable. The legislative effort failed.
In the lawsuit, Bach also changed his strategy. At the hearing on his
first bill of complaint, held more than three years after it had been filed and
well after Donaldson had been decided, Bach’s counsel apparently
introduced the Statute of Anne as a new basis for granting the relief
requested.238 Rather than ruling on the merits, the Chancellor certified to

234. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 279.
235. See Small, supra note 232, at 527 (asserting that “[t]he grounds available to Bach for an
action for breach of musical copyright therefore comprised an act which might not apply to music,
a common law right which some lawyers claimed did not exist, and a royal privilege which the
Crown may have had no power to grant”).
236. See id.
237. Bach and Abel’s petition read:
[A] Doubt has arisen, whether the sole Right granted by the said Act, to the
Author of any Book or Books, extends to the Author of any Book, Writing or
Composition in Music: And therefore praying, that Provision may be made, for
obviating such Doubt; and that they may have such Relief in the Premises as to the
House shall seem meet.
Id. at 528 (quoting petition); see also Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 279 (discussing
the petition). Parliament appears to have been unmoved by the petition. Hunter reports that the
official record from the committee hearing was not in petitioners’ favor, and “[a]s no
recommendations by the Committee concerning music were reported and no motions were put
before the House, we must assume that the legislators were satisfied with the status quo.” Id.
238. See Small, supra note 232, at 528 (“Bach’s counsel argued that music was a form of
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the Court of King’s Bench the question of whether a musical composition
was “within” the Statute of Anne.239 That court responded with a short
opinion authored by Lord Mansfield certifying that “a musical composition
is a writing within the Statue of the 8th of Queen Anne,”240 resolving sixtyseven years of doubt on this issue.241
Bach and Abel probably did not realize a positive return on their
investments in litigation and lobbying. Apparently, Longman and Lukey
settled the case after the Chancellor had issued a permanent injunction and
had ordered an accounting242 because in 1779 Longman published two
songs written by Bach for performance at Vauxhall Gardens.243 Bach’s
fortunes had turned during the pendency of the suit. The Bach and Abel
concert series had become a financial albatross because the rent had been
trebled, a move to another location had failed to attract sufficient audience
interest, and the cost of Bach’s subsequent purchase of a performance
space at Hanover Square could not be recouped.244 Abel withdrew from the
partnership, leaving Bach to answer for their debts.245 In 1782, Bach died
a debtor, and creditors attempted unsuccessfully to seize his body for sale
to medical schools.246 Doubts also surround whether other composers
benefitted immediately from the decision. According to F.M. Scherer, the
availability of composer’s copyright in England did not serve as a
sufficient incentive to attract composers living in countries, such as
Germany, that still did not recognize such a right.247

writing within the meaning of the copyright act. . . .”).
239. See Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1275 (K.B. 1777).
240. Id. at 1275 (emphasis added). The importance of the development of musical notation as
a precursor to copyright in music should be clear; it is only because music fits within the meaning
of a protected “writing” that Mansfield declared it within the scope of the Act. Cf. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant to authors the exclusive right to their “Writings”).
241. The case also established an important territorial principle in relation to copyright—the
rights under the Statute of Anne were not conditioned on the nationality of the author or composer
so long as he or she was resident in England. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 280.
As had been the case under the privilege system, however, non-resident foreign composers had no
standing to complain about British republication of works first appearing on the Continent. See
DOWNS, supra note 117, at 22 (1992) (referring anachronistically to the unauthorized British
republication of works by Continental composers as “[p]iracy”).
242. For the final order in the case, see Small, supra note 232, at 529.
243. See Small, supra note 232, at 529.
244. See SCHERER, supra note 39, at 59-60.
245. Id. at 60.
246. See id. at 175.
247. See id. at 195; see also id. at 194-96 (hypothesizing that “[t]he evolution of copyright
from an occasional grant of royal privilege to a formal and eventually widespread system of law
should in principle have enhanced composers’ income from publication,” and finding that incentive
effects for invention of music copyright are unproven).
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2. Publishers Embrace Copyright
Within music publishing, however, the consequences of Bach were farreaching. By bringing published music within the sphere of copyright, the
decision regularized the means for obtaining and enforcing rights, and it
established that these rights uniformly would be limited to the statutory
period rather than subject to the ad hoc duration of printing privileges.
Accepting their defeat, music publishers came to see registration at
Stationers’ Hall as beneficial because it served as proof of publication.248
Records from the registers of the Stationers’ Company show that, between
1700 and 1779, there were 175 music titles registered.249 From 1780-1789,
that number grew to 738, and it more that doubled in the decade
following. 250
Publishers also quickly warmed to copyright as a tool to guard their
profits. Shortly after Bach, Longman & Lukey reversed its litigation stance
and began suing upstart publishers under the Statute of Anne.251 As Nancy
Mace relates, two London booksellers sought to serialize music publishing
in a novel publication—the New Musical Magazine.252 In a telling
advertisement, they announced their goals to print “every Piece of Music
worth preserving” from English and foreign “celebrated composers” along
with a music dictionary explaining not only “every word used in this
Divine science, but even the true principles of the science itself; including
the rules for composition.”253
Longman & Lukey sued the upstarts in what fairly clearly was a
nuisance action.254 The defendants claimed that the suit had been brought
not so much for any real Value in the Opera in Question but
to destroy a publication of which it composed but a small part
because it is considered as inimical to the Interest of Music
Sellers in general who these Defendants say have long
enjoyed a most shameful Monopoly with little or no
advantage to Men of Genius or their families.255
Longman chose not to pursue the action further, and the bill was

248. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 280 (discussing the impact of Bach).
249. See id. at 281 tbl.1.
250. See id.
251. See Nancy A. Mace, Litigating the Musical Magazine: The Definition of British Music
Copyright in the 1780s, in 4 BOOK HISTORY 122-23 (Ezra Greenspan & Jonathan Rose eds., 2001).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 125-26 (quoting an advertisement from The Morning Chronicle, Oct. 25, 1783).
254. See id. at 126-27 (quoting PRO E112/1690/3452 London Public Record Office (1772)).
255. See id. at 135 (quoting PRO C33/462/9 London Public Record Office (1772)). There is
some irony in Harrison and Drury now championing the rights of “Men of Genius” when in all
likelihood they had been opponents of composers’ rights in the run-up to Bach. See id.
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dismissed.256 Other publishers successfully brought an action in Chancery
under the Statute of Anne to enjoin distribution of the first issue of the New
Musical Magazine because it included portions of Arne’s Artaxerxes, for
which the plaintiffs had purchased the rights.257
The functional-materialist account of intellectual property’s evolution
finds some support for its prediction of how copyright would be extended
to music, but the evidence does not fully conform to the theory’s
predictions. Certainly, composers who brought suit to assert and enforce
publication rights did so out of a desire to obtain a greater share of the
wealth generated by publication of their music.258 Certainly, defendant
publishers resisted composer’s copyright because it would have raised
costs and reduced profits.259 But, while the desire to acquire greater wealth
was certainly one motivation for composers, another was the desire to gain
control over how and when their works would be communicated to the
public.260 Even the desire for wealth was not solely to serve material selfinterest, for the acquisition of wealth had symbolic significance and
professional musicians dearly wished to be regarded as members of the
professional classes.261
Functional-materialist theories also have difficulty explaining the
absence of any attempt to create a public performance right by either
composers or publishers. Increases in publication revenues are not the only
evidence for the rising value of music as a resource in eighteenth-century
England because the invention and growth of commercialized public
performances also created a visible revenue stream.262 Why did composers
or publishers not seek exclusive rights in public performance of

256. See id. at 128 (citing PRO E127/48/Michaelmas 1786/257 London Public Record Office
(1772)).
257. See id. at 121-22. The Thompsons did not enter their copy in the Stationers’ Register until
four days prior to the November 1783 publication of Issue Number 1 of the New Musical Magazine.
Nonetheless, the Thompsons had put Harrison and Drury on clear notice of their claim of right prior
to publication, and Harrison and Drury proceeded. See id. at 141-43 (tracing chain of title in
Artaxerxes copyright).
258. See, e.g., Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 275 (describing composers’ attempts
to gain a greater share of publication revenues); FISKE, supra note 105, at 263 (describing Arne’s
desire to increase his share of profits).
259. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 276-77 (“Though some publishers might
advertise their disapproval of unauthorized editions . . . the activity was profitable enough for most
to practise it.”).
260. For example, Bach’s second bill of complaint emphasized not only his economic injury,
but also reputational and artistic injury because Longman & Lukey had adapted his work for
instruments not intended by him. See Ann Van Allen-Russell, ‘For Instruments Not Intended’: The
Second J.C. Bach Lawsuit, 83 MUSIC & LETTERS 3, 5, 8-9, 21-22 (2002) (quoting Bach as
complaining that his compositions were “very Ignorantly and, Much to the Discredit of this
Deponent as a composer, adapted to and for Instruments not intended by this Deponent”).
261. See ROHR, supra note 101, at 164-65.
262. See supra note 185.
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their music as the basis for claiming a share of performers’ revenues?
The efficiency strand of the functional-materialist account would
require evidence that composers or publishers could not feasibly or
efficiently have directly appropriated value from others’ performance of
their music by enforcing rights and granting performance licenses.263 The
political economy strand would require evidence that no interest group had
sufficient organizational clout to advocate for property rights in public
performance. Alternatively, it may have been possible to extend property
rights to other inputs, such as sheet music, and then adopt a pricing strategy
for those inputs that would allow composers and publishers to appropriate
some of the value generated by professional performance of their music.
While we do not have enough evidence to fully assess the success of either
approach, a more convincing approach appears to be an intellectualist
account according to which composers and publishers had not come to see
the intangible musical work as the resource that could be the subject of
property rights because they still had a more limited conception of printed
music as the resource that appropriately could be the subject of exclusive
rights.
D. Intellectual Themes from the Struggle
Consequently, it is important to also recognize changes in the
conceptual environment that took place during the struggle for composer’s
copyright. With respect to composer’s copyright in printed music, an
intellectualist account would focus on the power of the author’s right as an
organizing principle in relation to communicating in print, and more
specifically on extension of that concept to communicating musical
expression in print. The concept of author’s rights was not invented by the
English Parliament. Rather, the Statute of Anne gave government sanction
to a concept for which various authors had contended for some time.264
Recent scholarship has drawn increased attention to the development of
this concept.265 Less well recognized is that some composers also had
asserted claims of author’s rights well before the invention of copyright.266
A full analysis of the conceptual developments leading to composer’s
copyright is beyond the scope of this Article, but from the few reported

263. This explanation would have to contend with the fact that the practice of paying
composers to supply new works for concert performance was established with Joseph Haydn. See
MCVEIGH, supra note 55, at 169-70 (“The concept of star orchestral composer was unwittingly
invented by Haydn, who was offered generous inducements to travel to London.”).
264. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29, at 25 (explaining that in seventeenth-century England
“there may have been some feeling that authors should have the right to control the first publication
of their writings” but that the law offered no form of redress in cases of publication without the
author’s permission).
265. See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 29, ch. 1.
266. See Carroll, supra note 23, at 1482-83 (telling the story of Orlando di Lasso).
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decisions, we can identify certain conceptual uncertainties about author’s
rights that informed the struggle. These are as follows: (1) whether
composers were authors endowed with a property right under either
common-law copyright or the Statute of Anne; (2) whether published
musical compositions were books protected by the Statute of Anne; and (3)
whether or under what conditions musical compositions entered the public
domain.
1. Composers as Authors
Mark Rose has elegantly described and analyzed how the discourse of
Romantic authorship influenced and intersected with the legal discourse of
copyright under the Statute of Anne.267 Within that setting, the question of
whether musical composers were statutory authors highlights similarities
and important distinctions between those who composed literature and
learned works and those who composed music. The most salient similarity
of course was that musical composers, like literary composers, engaged in
an intellectual process of communication by rendering ideas in symbols
capable of being read on paper. But in three important respects, these
groups were distinct: literary authors enjoyed higher social status and
wealth than musical composers,268 the process of composing music was
more perceptively derivative than was literary composition,269 and the
social role of music as entertainment was less valued than the contribution
to learning that literature made.270
In the struggle for composer’s copyright, the question of authorship
arose repeatedly. As a conceptual matter, the defendant publishers appear
to have conceded that musical composers could be authors within the
Statute of Anne.271 For example, in Arne, Arne asserted that he was an
author by natural right.272 In their answer, Roberts and Johnson referred to
the creator of music alternatively as “[a]uthor, [i]nventor, or
267. See generally ROSE, supra note 29, ch. 7.
268. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29, at 58-59 (discussing the disposition of “[p]olite authors”
and Alexander Pope’s unique status).
269. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 105, at 274 (stating that borrowed music can be found in
about three out of four operas after 1762); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop:
Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(discussing evolution of musical borrowing practices from eighteenth-century England to present).
270. See, e.g., CHARLES BURNEY, 1 A GENERAL HISTORY OF MUSIC 21 (Dover 2d ed. 1957)
(1789) (“Music is an innocent luxury, unnecessary, indeed, to our existence, but a great
improvement and gratification of the sense of hearing.”).
271. See, e.g., infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
272. According to Arne, “having with great Study, Labour and Expense Composed several
Works Consisting of Vocall and Instrumentall Musick, [he] became Intitled thereby to the sole
property therein, and the same ought not to have been Printed, Published, uttered or sold” without
his permission. See Arne’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 178, at 135 (emphasis added). In his
telling, he sought the royal privilege “the better to Estabilsh his property to the same.” Id. at 135.

950

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

[c]omposer,”273 and they did not seriously dispute that a composer of music
was an “author” as that term is used in the Statute of Anne.274 Similarly, in
Pyle, the defendant appears to have conceded that if Isaac Bickerstaff had
written the music in question, he had a right to enter both works in the
Stationers’ Register “so as to Ascertain his property as the Author of [the]
said Opera, pursuant to [the] said Statute made in the eighth Year of Queen
Anne.”275
Frequently, however, the publishers suggested that authorship of music
required a high standard of originality to qualify for protection under any
legal theory. Roberts and Johnson suggested that Arne may have only rearranged “some old Songs made by Shakespear [sic] and other Authors.”276
Falkener similarly defended with respect to the Bickerstaff opera, claiming
that he did not know of any “New Tunes or New Music” that Bickerstaff
had composed and instead he had relied on “Old Tunes which had been
Used in Common by all persons for many years before the said Isaac
Bickerstaff wrote the said Opera.”277
The record reveals one other glimpse of Arne’s understanding of
author’s rights. In public advertisements, Arne complained about
publication of compositions falsely attributed to him.278 Free-riding off the
reputation of a famous composer had been a part of music publishing since
the Renaissance,279 and it was a practice about which successful composers
had been particularly bitter. In an advertisement published by Arne after
his printing privilege had expired, he announced that two or three songs
had been “imposed on the Public” that “were not the Doctor’s Music, but
Things vilely trumped up for the Unskilful.”280 He pledged to register his
works in Stationers Hall so that he might sue future perpetrators.281
This threat is revealing. Recall that Arne had received some legal
training, and he undoubtedly was both a business and legal entrepreneur.282
The conception of author’s rights evinced by his threat went well beyond
the statutory text if Arne genuinely understood the Statute of Anne to

273. See Answer of Roberts and Johnson, supra note 197, at 137.
274. Id. at 139.
275. Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Rabin &
Zohn, supra note 163, at 144.
276. Answer of Roberts and Johnson, supra note 197, at 137.
277. Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Rabin &
Zohn, supra note 163, at 144. Falkener alleged that Bickerstaff was the putative author of both
Thomas and Sally (rather than Arne) and Love in a Village (co-authored with Arne). Id.
278. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
279. See Carroll, supra note 23, at 1480.
280. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 125 (quoting from The Public Advertiser, Jan. 27,
1761).
281. See id.
282. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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supply a cause of action against palming off.283 Indeed, under
contemporary American copyright law, attribution disputes are deemed to
be trademark rather than copyright issues.284
2. Whether Musical Compositions Were Protected “Books”
The question of whether printed musical compositions were “books”
appears to have posed the greatest conceptual hurdle for composer’s
copyright. Understood literally, a book described sheets produced by letter
press printing that have been bound together. In the eighteenth-century, the
exclusive rights afforded by printing patents and the Statute of Anne
generally applied to rights to print and sell such objects. The notion that
copyright might apply to some intangible work reflected in material copies
had only begun to germinate. A celebrated case brought by Alexander Pope
established that copyright extended to an author’s private letters and that
the author retained ownership of publication rights even if the letters
belonged to the recipient.285 This distinction between intangible and
tangible properties remains a critical one for copyright law and may well
be the most important part or aspect of the case’s legacy.286
We can see doubts about whether sheet music could qualify as a book
in the manner in which Arne pursued his case. As a self-styled author, he
should have been able to rely on the Statute of Anne by registering his

283. As Mark Rose discusses, Alexander Pope similarly mixed the discourses of property and
propriety in the preface to Pope’s 1737 publication of his correspondence, in which he railed
against booksellers for filling out a volume with material penned by another so that the author has
“not only Theft to fear, but Forgery.” Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), in
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 211, 219
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (quoting 1 ALEXANDER POPE, THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER POPE, at xl (1956)). The circumstances of Pope’s complaint were
laden with disingenuity, as he had contrived to have his letters published by another so as to supply
a gentleman with the predicate for issuing an authorized version of his private correspondence. See
id. at 216-17.
284. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 265 (2004).
285. See Rose, supra note 283, at 211; cf. Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Martin (O.S.) 297 (La. 1811)
(deciding the issue on privacy grounds). I thank Anuj Desai for this comparison.
286. Two other features of the case bear mentioning for purposes of the story of music
copyright. First is that Pope’s advocate, who advanced this broad reading of the Statute of Anne,
was William Murray—who later became Lord Mansfield, one of the original copyright maximalists
and the author of Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1777). Second is that although the
court in Pope extended the Statute of Anne to private correspondence, it implicitly accepted the
defendant’s argument that the Statute of Anne’s protection extended only to books that were in
some way learned or that encouraged learning. The court ruled in Pope’s favor because “no works
have done more service to mankind” than private correspondence. See Pope v. Curll, 26 Eng. Rep.
608, 608 (Ch. 1741). As Mark Rose observes, this understanding of the Statute’s reach put judges
in the position of making “literary critical proclamation[s] from the bench.” Rose, supra note 283,
at 222.
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works in Stationers’ Hall. He chose not to, even though some composers
had.287 Moreover, in his suit he relied principally on his royal privilege as
the basis for equitable relief.288 He alleged that Roberts and Johnson “had
Notice from Publick adverstisements and otherwise of his Majesty’s Royall
Lycence and priviledge aforesaid” and, after waiving any claims to
monetary relief, sought an injunction “till after the said fourteen years are
Expired, or for such other time as your Lordship shall think reasonable.”289
The “said fourteen years” were the term of his privilege, not those granted
under the Statute of Anne.290
A further reason for skepticism about the strength of Arne’s copyright
claim is that the parties treated his Engraving Act claim as equally viable,
and they treated the claim under royal privilege to be the more serious.
Others in the trade also viewed the privilege as worthy of respect, as a few
years after Arne had publicized his privilege, two publishers printed only
lyrics and not Arne’s accompanying music to two songs because of Arne’s
threat to sue.291
Even at its strongest, Arne’s understanding of the Statute of Anne’s
application to music demonstrates the limits of that application. In the
advertisement he placed after his royal privilege had expired, Arne
declared that “All his future Works (single Songs excepted) will be
published in Books or Pamphlets, and entered with the Company of
Stationers, as the Act of Parliamont directs; such Method being under the
immediate Protection of the Common Law” insofar as unauthorized
publications could be enjoined.292 Arne’s distinction between music
published in books or pamphlets as being covered by the Act and single
songs as being excepted is telling. 293
From the defendant publishers’ perspective, even if musical composers
were authors, the Statute of Anne had not been enacted to protect all
authors, but only those who had advanced the cause of learning by
producing books. In their view, printed music did not fit within this
concept. For example, responding to Arne, Roberts and Johnson flatly
rejected the notion: “[T]he Musick and Songs published by the
Complainant are not such Books as are by the said Act intended to be

287. See Hunter, Music Copyright, supra note 77, at 278 (noting that a few of the music
copyright registrants between 1710 and 1780 were individual composers).
288. Rabin and Zohn suggest that Arne “threw into the legal pot whatever he could expecting
at least one of the arguments” to supply grounds for equitable relief. Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163,
at 120. While Arne undoubtedly did seek to cover his bases by including his copyright and
Engraving Act claims, on my reading, his complaint primarily seeks enforcement of his privilege.
289. See Arne’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 178, at 136.
290. Id.
291. See Rabin & Zohn, supra note 163, at 124.
292. Id. at 125 (quoting from The Public Advertiser, Jan. 27, 1761).
293. Cf. infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text (describing judicial reluctance to hold a
single sheet of music to be a “book” within the Statute of Anne).
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preserved to the Author for the Encouragement of Learning.”294 Decades
later, Robert Falkener would take the same position with respect to the
Statute of Anne: “Nor doth he [Falkener] know or believe that any person
whomsoever can Acquire to himself any sole or distinct Right and property
in or to Musical Compositions, and that the same are not as he Insists an
Object of distinct property.”295 With respect to the common-law claim,
Falkener similarly asserted that “Musical Compositions are not a Subject
of Literary property.”296 Apparently, when the issue arose in Bach,
Longman and Lukey also denied music’s copyrightability. 297
While Bach resolved the issue, it is telling that Mansfield did not
directly hold that music was a “book” within the Statute. Instead he wrote:
The words of the Act of Parliament are very large: “books and
other writings.” It is not confined to language or letters. Music
is a science: it may be written; and the mode of conveying the
ideas, is by signs and marks. A person may use the copy by
playing it; but he has no right to rob the author of the profit,
by multiplying copies and disposing of them to his own use.
If the narrow interpretation contended for in the argument
were to hold, it would equally apply to algebra, mathematics,
arithmetic, hieroglyphics. All these are conveyed by signs and
figures. . . . [W]e are of opinion, that a musical composition
is a writing within the Statute of the 8th of Queen Anne.298
Note that the phrase “Books[] and other Writings” appears only in the
Statute’s preamble.299 The operative provisions apply only to “books.”300
If taken literally, the court’s holding that a musical composition is “a
writing” within the Statute would leave composers without protection.
That clearly was not Mansfield’s intent. Instead of holding that the term
“book” encompassed musical compositions, Mansfield chose to construe
the term “book” in the operative provisions as shorthand for “books and
other writings” and hold that musical compositions were such other
writings.301 What explains that choice? Perhaps Mansfield thought that

294. See Answer of Roberts and Johnson, supra note 197, at 139.
295. Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Rabin &
Zohn, supra note 163, at 144.
296. See id. at 143.
297. See Small, supra note 232, at 528.
298. Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (K.B. 1777) (emphasis added). The importance of
the development of musical notation as a precursor to copyright in music should be clear; it is only
because music fits within the meaning of a protected “writing” that Mansfield declared it within the
scope of the Act. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant to authors the
exclusive right to their “Writings”).
299. 8 Ann., ch. 19 (1710).
300. See id.
301. See Bach, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1275.
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importing “other writings” into the Act’s subject matter would better
broaden its scope, but the choice also reflects a certain reticence to ask
readers to accept a more pliable understanding of “books.” This hesitancy
reinforces how different engraved music appeared to be from printed books
even in the latter eighteenth century.
Indeed, in subsequent cases, the question arose whether a single sheet
of music was a copyrightable book. The Court of King’s Bench struggled
with this issue, torn between a plain meaning approach to statutory
construction that would have rejected such a claim and a more functional
approach that would prohibit free-riding on the composer’s creativity
whether expressed on one sheet or many. 302 Ultimately, in Clementi v.
Goulding,303 the court initially held that a single sheet of music was a
“book” within the Statute of Anne and directed that a verdict be entered for
the plaintiff.304 The court had sufficient doubt about its ruling, however,
that the defendant persuaded it to issue a rule to show cause why the
verdict should not be set aside.305 Apparently, the defendant subsequently
acquiesced in the verdict, and the matter was settled.306
3. Public Domain
Some commentators have argued that because the Statute of Anne
limited the term of copyright protection, it implicitly created the concept
of a “public domain”—i.e., a legal status for books whose copyright has
expired.307 Arguably, the time-limited royal privileges that had been

302. See Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 (K.B. 1803) (initially dismissing complaint for
infringement on grounds that sheet music could not be a protected “book” and then reversing that
decision and ordering a new trial).
303. 103 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1809).
304. See id. at 98-99.
305. See id.
306. See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000-01 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1829) (“It seems
to be well settled in England, that a literary production, to be entitled to the protection of the statute
on copyrights . . . . may be printed on one sheet, as the words of a song or the music accompanying
it.”).
307. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 144. To be clear, it is the Statute of Anne, as
interpreted by the House of Lords in Donaldson, that gives rise to this notion. See, e.g., Mark Rose,
Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 86-87 (2003) (“Perhaps the single most important moment in the
establishment of the public domain was, as this article suggests, the foundational case of Donaldson
in 1774, which confirmed that the term of protection was limited.”); see also KARTHYRN TEMPLE ,
SCANDAL NATION: LAW AND AUTHORSHIP IN BRITAIN 1750-1832 114-19 (2003) (discussing
relationship between transition from oral tradition to literary expression in culture and law and
effect of that transition on construction of public domain). Subsequently, in the United States, the
idea of implicit public dedication became more explicit. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 978 (1990) (“The idea that a statutory copyright carries with it a dedication to
the public of aspects of or rights in the copyrighted work emerged in the case law of the
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granted for hundreds of years prior to the Statute already had created such
a legal concept. But those royal privileges were subject to extension and
renewal, and privileges covered works that were hundreds and even
thousands of years old.308
In the equity actions discussed above, a third source of authority for the
public domain emerges—custom. Just as the Stationers had constructed an
account of custom in the publishing trade as a foundation for their claims
of common-law copyright during the Battle of the Booksellers,309 music
publishers constructed an account of a customary public domain as part of
their defense. Implicit in the publishers’ challenges to musical authorship
discussed above is the view that old songs were free to be re-used in the
creation of new ones and could be freely republished. In Pyle, the
defendant Falkener claimed that a work previously published and not
covered by a privilege could freely be republished “as it has been ye
Custom, Usage and practice for all persons who thought proper so to
do.”310 Similarly, when attacking the claims regarding Bickerstaff’s works,
Falkener argued that Bickerstaff had no proprietary rights because he had
merely borrowed from “Old Tunes which had been Used in Common by
all persons for many years before the said Isaac Bickerstaff wrote the said
Opera.”311
The evolution of music copyright in England involved more than a
materialist struggle over the growing revenues from music publishing. In
litigation and in threatening advertisements, professional composers, music
publishers, lawyers, and the courts tested the pliability of the concepts of
authorship and of copyright. Donaldson determined that statutory law was
the sole source of authority for copyright, but Bach demonstrated that the
concept of copyright could be readily expanded through statutory
interpretation. Donaldson also confirmed that the expiration of copyright
placed a work in the public domain. The scope of the statutory public
domain was confined to rights of republication because of the Statute of
Anne’s limited scope. But, relatedly, composers had different views about
the scope of legitimate borrowing of melodies, harmonies, and other
compositional components from each other, and this question of the scope
mid-nineteenth century as a matter of statutory construction.”).
308. Indeed, it was the Stationers’ exclusive control over publishing ancient Greek and Roman
texts that led John Locke to lobby to end their monopoly. See Letter from John Locke, to Edward
Clarke (Jan. 2, 1693), in THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE 366
(Benjamin Rand ed., 1927).
309. The argument for common-law copyright first emerged during the run-up to the Statute
of Anne. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 209 (1769) (describing Stationers’ description of
author’s common-law copyright as reflecting an “ancient and reasonable” custom); Feather, supra
note 72, at 34-35.
310. See Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442 London Public Record Office (1772), reprinted in Rabin
& Zohn, supra note 163, at 143 (reciting Falkener’s argument).
311. Id. at 144.
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of legitimate borrowing would become a more central conceptual concern
during the nineteenth century and continues to be debated to the present
day.312
IV. CONCLUSION
What should we make of the gradual extension of copyright law to
music and of the very circumscribed portion of musicmaking that fell
within the domain of early copyright law? My hope is that a better
understanding of this history triggers a variety of responses. In this section,
I offer three.
A. The Progress Narrative in Copyright Law
On first glance, it would have been easy to read Bach as a natural
extension of copyright—the correction of an oversight. However, closer
attention to this episode in copyright history makes clear that copyright
does not naturally extend itself to new subject matter. Rather, certain
participants within a community of social practice—such as those who
create music, photography, or software—find the rights supplied by
copyright to be an attractive alternative to existing arrangements and
struggle to extend copyright to the subject matter. The extension of
copyright to new subject matter does not merely fill a void. Instead, it
displaces a preexisting set of formal or informal means of relating to that
subject matter.
The establishment and extension of copyright law comes with a social
cost.313 This is an old lesson that bears reemphasis. Shortly after Italian
authorities had begun granting printing privileges, they quickly learned that
printing privileges solved one problem by stimulating investments in new
publications, but they created another by starving new publishers of a
source of material with which to ply their trade.314 To this day, balancing
incentives to create and publish against the need for access to published or
invented knowledge remains the central problem that copyright and patent
law must resolve.
Thus, the displacement of prior arrangements by copyright should not
necessarily be viewed as a form of legal progress—from a primitive
privilege system to a more evolved copyright regime. Instead, as is true of
all disputes concerning the applicability and scope of copyright, Bach
should be understood as the outcome of a specific political struggle.

312. See generally Arewa, supra note 269 (discussing evolution of musical borrowing
practices from eighteenth-century England to present).
313. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Intellectual property rights aren’t free: They’re
imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.”).
314. See BUGBEE, supra note 66, at 45.
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Whether this outcome should be viewed as forward movement should be
judged on the basis of one’s normative criteria concerning how liberties315
should be allocated among creators, disseminators, and users of music
rather than as autonomous progress. On this view, the relevant historical
continuities and discontinuities pertain as much, if not more so, to the
social practices surrounding specific forms of expression than simply to the
legal system’s internal developments.316 This is a view of federated rather
than unitary copyright, and on this view, copyright’s displacement of prior
legal arrangements concerning forms of expression—be that music,
software, or architecture, for example—cannot simply be pronounced
progress per se. In some cases, extension of copyright may be viewed as
liberation and in others as colonization, depending on whether the broader
justifications for using copyright apply with equal force to a particular
form of expression.
B. History and Contemporary Copyright
From my perspective, the result in Bach should be viewed positively
because composers had begun to rely on market exchange and selfpublication to support their art, and the extension of copyright marginally
improved their ability to compose independently of their patron’s
desires.317 From the perspective of musicmaking, Bach modestly
reallocated liberties by granting to composers a legal basis for participating
in publishing profits while leaving other composers free to continue their
traditional borrowing and leaving performers, professional and amateur,
with plenty of room to experience music on their own terms.
In contrast, modern copyright law’s governance of relations in music
should be seen as containing many discontinuities. Traditional borrowing
practices, long regarded as a composer’s liberty, increasingly have become
circumscribed by threatened litigation. In the age of digitally recorded
music, a composer’s use of even a short sequence from a prior recording
is likely to draw a lawsuit.318 Moreover, public performance of music lay

315. My use of “liberties” in place of “rights” is advised. The first copyright act did not grant
authors any “rights,” although it may well have assumed the existence of some, and instead was
phrased as conferring on the author or proprietor of a copy the “sole liberty” of having a work
printed, reprinted, sold, or imported. Because “liberties” are less easily reified than are rights, and
because liberties generally are associated with what natural persons may do, discussing copyright
in terms of an allocation of liberties clarifies the law’s real-world effects.
316. Cf. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525 (2004) (analyzing and explaining fair use doctrine in relation to social roles and patterns
of information exchange).
317. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (arguing that democratic theory favors creation of copyright law to promote
diversity of expression by liberating authors from economic dependence on patrons).
318. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Beastie Boys’s use

958

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

outside copyright’s boundaries until the end of the nineteenth century.319
Prior to that reallocation of liberties, the view in England and America had
been that “[a] person may use the copy by playing it; but he has no right to
rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing of them
to his own use.”320
Consequently, the modern battle to reallocate rights in music should be
understood as lacking any clear precedent. The question is how rights or
liberties should be allocated under current conditions. The Bach case
suggests a useful focus—identifying the activities from which the author
should be entitled to profit.321 In 1777, the law gave the right to profit from
printing to the author and from performance to the professional performer.
Under contemporary conditions, with a far greater range of uses of music
possible, which of these should be understood to belong exclusively to the
composer? My view is that composers should control only the minimum
number of uses necessary to stimulate a vibrant musical economy.322
Making that determination should be done with reference to the current
economics of making, marketing, and distributing music.
Allocating liberties in relation to music likely will entail both
legislative and judicial judgments. Concerns about historical continuity are
less influential in the legislative arena, but these still resonate. It is
important that the many new uses enabled by digital technology and the
radically changed economics of music production and distribution mark the
current moment as unprecedented in many ways. Consequently, we should
give little weight to historically grounded arguments claiming that
continuous expansion of the subject matter, scope, and duration of rights
under copyright has always been, and will continue to be, socially
beneficial. In the judicial arena, recognizing the discontinuities of the
present should serve as a check on expansionist tendencies in this branch
of the law and should influence the ways in which courts interpret the fair
use doctrine, and the broader relationship between copyright law and the
First Amendment.
C. Professional Musicians and Copyright’s Evolution
Copyright lawyers generally share an understanding that well-financed,
well-organized distributors beginning with the Company of Stationers and
of a short sample was a permissible de minimis use).
319. See Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694 (reallocating right of public performance
from public to composer).
320. Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1274 (K.B. 1777).
321. Cf. Tonson v. Collins, 96 Eng. Rep. 169, 169 (1761) (“I contend it belongs to the author;
and when I speak of the right of property, I mean in the profits of his book, not in the sentiments,
style, & c.”).
322. Cf. FISHER, supra note 9, at 215 (suggesting the goal of sustaining a “flourishing
entertainment culture” as a normative criterion for alternative compensation schemes).
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continuing to groups such as the RIAA and the MPAA have been the
primary agents of change in copyright law’s evolution.323 Most copyright
historians recognize that authors periodically have played important roles
as well, however.324 Authors who invested time and energy in enlarging
their respective rights under copyright include figures such as Daniel
DeFoe, 3 2 5 Jonathan Swift, 3 2 6 Alexander Pope, 3 2 7 William
Wordsworth,328 Charles Dickens,329 Mark Twain,330 and Gilbert and
Sullivan.331 Johann Christian Bach and Karl Friedrich Abel should be
added to this list.
In the world of contemporary popular music, certain authors also have
stepped forward to engage in legal reform. Recall that Bach and Abel
fought to extend copyright to music as part of a struggle with publishers.
Contemporary legal disputes between musical authors and publishers
center on who rightfully is the author of a sound recording332 and whether
the law should or may regulate the terms of author-publisher recording

323. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 147 (“Emphasis on the author in the Statute of
Anne implying that statutory copyright was an author’s copyright was more a matter of form than
of substance.”). See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (describing copyright’s
legislative evolution during the twentieth century).
324. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 29, at 48 (“[A] number of influential writers had raised the
issue of authorial rights.”).
325. See id. at 34-37 (noting that DeFoe published his Essay on the Regulation of the Press
in which he called for a parliamentary law to protect authorial property rights).
326. See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the
Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 922-23 (2003) (suggesting that Swift was the drafter of
the Statute of Anne).
327. See ROSE, supra note 29, at 60-65 (describing Pope’s copyright litigation).
328. See id. at 110-11 (describing Wordsworth’s lobbying for extending the term of copyright
to life of the author plus sixty years).
329. See AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 58-63 (1960) (describing Dickens’s campaigning for copyright reform in
America in 1906).
330. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 35-37 (2001) (describing Twain’s testimony before
the Joint Committee on Patents).
331. See EDWARD SAMUELS , THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 232-34 (2000)
(describing how Gilbert and Sullivan went to extraordinary steps to withhold publication of their
scores).
332. See, e.g., David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the
Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 387, 390-91 (2001) (describing
insertion and subsequent deletion of language inserted into a “clarification” bill that would have
rendered sound recordings by independent contractors eligible to be works made for hire under 17
U.S.C. § 101). The songwriter and performer Don Henley, who has been a leader in advocating for
composer’s and performing artists’ interests and who cofounded the Recording Artists’ Coalition,
sings about the imbroglio in his song “Inside Job.”
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contracts.333
The manner in which contemporary composers approach questions such
as whether rights under copyright should be expanded and how existing
rights should be enforced and/or licensed is heterogenous and quite
interesting. The Internet’s power as a mechanism for producing,
distributing, and marketing music is encouraging professional musicians
to engage more directly with copyright law. Early responses indicated that
established musicians shared publishers’ reaction to the Internet as nothing
more than a threat. Recall that recording artists Metallica and Dr. Dre were
first out of the box to sue Napster for copyright infringement.334 Some
found irony in Metallica’s stance, since this band, which had an unusual
degree of control over its copyrights, generally permitted fans to record
live shows and trade tapes noncommercially. 335 The band reportedly filed
its suit because an insider had made soon-to-be-released material available
on the Napster network.336
Some professional songwriters continue to demonize those who create the
software for peer-to-peer networks and those who transmit music files across
these networks.337 Others, however, have begun to embrace the new
technologies and their users.338 Recently, bands such as Wilco have
successfully released their material on peer-to-peer networks as a form of

333. See, e.g., Martin Edlund, Lyin’ Eyes: The Recording Artists Coalition’s Bogus Crusade
to Save the Little Guy, SLATE, Feb. 11, 2002, available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2061830/.
334. See John Snell, Artists Denounce Music Free-For-All, OREGONIAN , May 1, 2000, at B1
(stating that both Metallica and Dr. Dre filed suit against Napster claiming $100,000 for each song
downloaded via Napster); see also Industry Upbeat Over Ruling Blames Napster for $84M Drop
in Canadian Music Sales, OTTAWA SUN, Feb. 13, 2001, at 12 (giving timeline of lawsuits against
Napster).
335. See My, How Time Flies. It’s Four Years Since the Napster Suit, ONLINE REP., Apr. 1723, 2004, at http://www.onlinereporter.com/TORbackissues/TOR392.htm (stating that Metallica
encouraged fans to tape their concerts and make bootleg copies); In the Know/ A Look at the Week
Ahead; Metallica Finds Itself at Odds with Fans, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2000, at F2 (stating that
Metallica invited fans to tape-record their concerts); Napster Settles Suits by Metallica, Dr. Dre,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 2001, at C2.
336. See Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox; Efforts to Obtain Control Access to Sound
Recordings from the Internet, ATLANTIC MONTHLY , Sept. 1, 2000, at 39. Metallica filed suit after
learning that Napster users had been trading an unreleased and unfinished version of the band’s
forthcoming single, “I Disappear,” from the soundtrack to the film Mission Impossible 2. Id.
337. See, e.g., Hugh Prestwood, An Open Letter to File-Sharers, BILLBOARD, Apr. 10, 2003
(asserting that “If you won’t pay for music, you will soon be receiving a product commensurate
with your thriftiness. A society that doesn’t value a commodity enough to pay for it will soon see
the creation and production of that commodity cease.”).
338. See, e.g., Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle-An Alternative View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER
MAG., May 2002, available at http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html (describing
the benefits of online distribution of music, including through peer-to-peer file sharing); see also
Janis Ian, Fallout–A Follow Up to the Internet Debacle, Aug. 1, 2002, at
http://www.janisian.com/article-fallout.html (last visited July 10, 2005).
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marketing.339 We see similarly conflicting reactions to uses of new
technologies for creating digital samples and derivative works. Flautist James
Newton thought that his copyright should have given him the right to control
the Beastie Boys’s use of a small portion of one of his solos. The Ninth Circuit
held that musical copyright does not extend that far.340 By contrast, Wired
magazine persuaded a number of prominent artists, such as David Byrne,
the Beastie Boys, and Chuck D, to release songs on a compilation CD
distributed with the November 2004 issue of the magazine under a
Creative Commons sampling license, which gives listeners explicit
permission to create and use samples such as the one at issue in Newton.341
Copyright lawyers should pay close attention to professional musicians’
evolving attitudes about new technologies and copyright law. These
technologies give artists the material incentives and abilities to keep
control over the copyrights in their music and to experiment with different
licensing models for these copyrights. Conditions in eighteenth-century
England led professional composers such as Johann Christian Bach to
engage directly with copyright law, and, interestingly, current conditions
also appear to be ripe for enticing musical artists to become more directly
involved in the evolution of copyright law through legislation and
litigation. If these artists do become more involved, we should expect the
path of copyright law to take some interesting turns, as the legal
relationships among producers, distributors, and consumers continue to be
redefined.

339. See, e.g., Brian Mansfield, When Free Is Profitable, USA TODAY, May 20, 2004,
available as updated at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/music/2004-05-20-file-sharingmain_x.htm.
340. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 593-94, 598 (9th Cir. 2003).
341. See WIRED (Nov. 2004); see also Creative Commons Sampling Licenses, available at
http://creativecommons.org/projects/sampling (last visited July 10, 2005). [Disclosure: I serve on
the Board of Directors of Creative Commons, Inc.].

